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Abstract
Group-based cryptography is concerned with the role of nonabelian groups in
cryptography. Since its origins in the 1980s, there have been numerous crypto-
graphic proposals based on nonabelian groups, many of which have been broken.
This thesis adds to the cryptanalytic literature by demonstrating the insecurity of
several group-based cryptosystems. We cryptanalyse several key establishment
protocols based on matrix groups, due to (i) Baumslag, Camps, Fine, Rosenberger
and Xu, (ii) Habeeb, Kahrobaei, and Shpilrain, (iii) Romanczuk and Ustimenko,
and (iv) a modified version of a scheme by Stickel. We also cryptanalyse the MST3
public key cryptosystem and treat the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent times numerous cryptographic protocols have emerged based on group
theoretic concepts. Such protocols have not yet led to practical schemes to rival the
likes of RSA and Diffie–Hellman, but the ideas are interesting and have led to some
rewarding group theory.
With the realisation that quantum computers can efficiently solve both the Inte-
ger Factorisation Problem and standard variants of the Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem [79], the search for alternative cryptosystems has become more important.
Cryptosystems, including group-based examples, that are not necessarily vulnera-
ble to quantum adversaries have become known as post-quantum cryptosystems.
A well-known example is the McEliece cryptosystem based on the difficulty of de-
coding error-correcting codes. Other examples include lattice-based cryptosystems
and cryptosystems based on large systems of multivariate polynomial equations.
This thesis is concerned with group-based cryptography: the design and anal-
ysis of cryptographic schemes based on nonabelian groups. More specifically, we
explore the role of matrix groups as a platform for group-based cryptosystems. If
one is to implement a group-based cryptosystem, one needs an efficient method of
representing, storing and manipulating group elements. For these reasons matrix
groups are an attractive source of nonabelian groups: matrices are easy to store
and represent on a computer, and linear algebra provides an efficient tool to ma-
nipulate elements. But linear algebra is also a powerful tool for the cryptanalyst.
Indeed, the focus of this thesis is on cryptanalysis. We demonstrate the insecurity
of several group-based cryptosystems that employ matrix groups as a platform,
rendering them unfit for use in the real world. We treat several key establishment
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protocols, a public key cryptosystem, and a group-based hash function. With the
exception of the hash function (where we will be concerned with collision resis-
tance) we work in the passive adversary model. Thus we assume that an adversary
has the power only of an eavesdropper who knows everything about the system
being used except for secret keys and random choices made by individual parties.
An outline of this thesis is as follows. In this introductory chapter we give a
short account of the emergence of group-based cryptography. In Chapter 2 we
cryptanalyse several matrix-based key establishment protocols [9, 41, 76, 86]. In
Chapter 3 we study the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function [92], and in Chapter 4 we
cryptanalyse the public key cryptosystem MST3 [50]. We close with some remarks
and directions for future work in Chapter 5.
We assume the reader has some familiarity with basic concepts from abstract
algebra and cryptography. All the necessary prerequisites may be found, for exam-
ple, in Fraleigh [29] and Stinson [88].
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.1 we provide some
background material and describe two well-known key establishment protocols:
the Diffie–Hellman Protocol and Shamir’s ‘no-key’ Protocol; this serves as moti-
vation for the ensuing discussion on group-based protocols. In Section 1.2 we de-
scribe the two most widely studied schemes in group-based cryptography, and in
Section 1.3 we discuss variants of these schemes. In Section 1.4 we mention some
symmetric schemes involving nonabelian groups. We sketch some successful at-
tacks on group-based schemes in Section 1.5, and close in Section 1.6 with a brief
discussion.
We remark that this introductory chapter is based on the survey paper [11].
More detailed surveys of group-based cryptography are given by Dehornoy [26],
Garber [30], and Myasnikov et al. [67].
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1.1 CRYPTOGRAPHY USING GROUPS
1.1 Cryptography using Groups
The first proposal to use nonabelian groups in public key cryptography is due to
Wagner and Magyarik [94] in 1985. The cryptosystem is based on the hardness of
the Word Problem (or more accurately the Word Choice Problem) for finitely pre-
sented groups. However, the scheme is rather theoretical with several unresolved
issues: critiques are given by Gonza´lez Vasco and Steinwandt [39] and Levy-dit-
Vehel and Perret [52, 53].
The importance of Wagner and Magyarik’s scheme lies in its novelty, which
commenced an interplay between cryptography and combinatorial group theory.
Let G be a group given by a finite presentation. In 1911, Max Dehn [27] posed the
following problems:
– The Word Problem: given a word w on the generators of G, decide if w = 1 in
G.
– The Conjugacy Problem: given words u, v on the generators of G, decide if u
and v represent conjugate elements in G.
– The Isomorphism Problem: given two finite presentations, decide if they
present isomorphic groups.
The study of these problems has proven remarkably fruitful. For example, a fa-
mous result due (independently) to Novikov [69] and Boone [16] states that there
exists a finitely presented group with recursively unsolvable word problem. The
introduction of group-based cryptography has put a twist on some of these well-
studied decision problems. Suppose one is given two elements g, h ∈ G, together
with knowledge that they are conjugate in G. The task is to find some x ∈ G
such that g = x−1hx. This is not a decision problem, rather it is a search problem,
known as the Conjugacy Search Problem. It forms the basis for two high profile
group-based key agreement protocols due to Anshel, Anshel and Goldfeld [3] in
1999 and Ko, Lee, Cheon, Han, Kang and Park [49] in 2000. Ko et al. also describe a
11
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public key encryption scheme, the security of which is also based on the Conjugacy
Search Problem.
The key agreement scheme of Ko et al. may be seen as a generalisation of the
Diffie–Hellman Protocol to nonabelian groups, with the Conjugacy Search Problem
acting as a group-theoretic analogue of the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Thus prior
to discussing the schemes of Anshel et al. and Ko et al. we recall the Diffie–Hellman
Protocol [28] and the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Later, in chapter 2, we will
discuss a group-theoretic analogue of Shamir’s ‘no-key’ Protocol [61, Page 500], so
we also describe this protocol here.
Diffie–Hellman Key Agreement Protocol
Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group, with both g and its order d publicly known. To create
a shared key, Alice and Bob proceed as follows:
1. Alice selects uniformly at random an integer a ∈ [2, d − 1] and sends ga to
Bob.
2. Bob selects uniformly at random an integer b ∈ [2, d−1] and sends gb to Alice.
3. Alice computes ka = (gb)a ∈ G. Bob computes kb = (ga)b ∈ G.
4. The shared key is ka = kb ∈ G.
Shamir’s ‘no-key’ Key Transport Protocol
Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group, with both g and its order d publicly known. To create
a shared key, Alice and Bob proceed as follows:
1. Alice selects uniformly at random a key k = gr ∈ G, an integer a ∈ [2, d− 1],
and sends ka ∈ G to Bob.
2. Bob selects uniformly at random an integer b ∈ [2, d − 1], and sends (ka)b =
kab ∈ G to Alice.
3. Alice computes (kab)a
−1
= kb ∈ G and sends kb to Bob.
12
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4. Bob computes (kb)b
−1
= k.
The security of the Diffie–Hellman Protocol relies on the assumption that know-
ing g ∈ G and having observed both ga and gb, it is computationally infeasible for
an adversary to compute gab. This is known as the Diffie–Hellman Problem. The
Diffie–Hellman Problem is related to the well-known Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP): given h ∈ G = 〈g〉, find an integer t such that gt = h. If one can efficienty
solve the DLP then one can efficiently solve the Diffie–Hellman Problem and thus
break the Diffie–Hellman Protocol. Similarly Shamir’s ‘no-key’ Protocol relies on
the hardness of the DLP. Thus as a minimum requirement one is interested in find-
ing difficult instances of the DLP. The difficulty of the DLP depends heavily on the
way the group G is represented, not just on the isomorphism class of G. For ex-
ample, the DLP is trivial if G = Z/dZ is the additive group generated by g = 1.
However, ifG is an appropriately chosen group then solving the DLP is considered
computationally infeasible. In practice one often uses G = F∗
pl
for an appropriately
selected prime p and exponent l, or the group of points of a properly chosen elliptic
curve over a finite field.
1.2 From Exponentiation to Conjugacy
Let G be a nonabelian group. For g, x ∈ G write gx for x−1gx, the conjugate of g by
x. At first sight, the notation suggests that conjugation might be used instead of ex-
ponentiation in cryptographic contexts. Assuming that we can find a group where
the Conjugacy Search Problem is hard, and assuming the elements of this group
are easy to store and manipulate, one can define cryptosystems that are analogues
of cryptosystems based on the DLP.
Ko et al. [49] proposed the following analogue of the Diffie–Hellman Protocol.
Ko–Lee–Cheon–Han–Kang–Park Key Agreement Protocol
Let G be a nonabelian group and let g be a publicly known element of G. Let A,B
be commuting subgroups of G, that is ab = ba for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B. The groups A,B
13
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and G are public. To create a shared key, Alice and Bob proceed as follows:
1. Alice selects an element a ∈ A and sends ga = a−1ga to Bob.
2. Bob selects an element b ∈ B and sends gb = b−1gb to Alice.
3. Alice computes ka = (gb)a ∈ G. Bob computes kb = (ga)b ∈ G.
4. Since ab = ba, we have ka = kb ∈ G.
An important subtlety of the protocol is that although ka = kb as group elements,
their bitstring representations might be different. But for many groups, a shared
key may be derived from ka and kb. For example, if G has an efficient algorithm to
compute a normal form for a group element, then the shared key can be extracted
from the normal form of ka and kb. We can summarise the minimum security re-
quirements on the platform group G:
– The group G should have two large commuting subgroups (i.e. of exponen-
tial size in some appropriate security parameter, word length with respect to
some normal form, for example).
– The group G should have an efficient normal form algorithm.
– The Conjugacy Search Problem in G should be generically hard.
Interest in Ko et al.’s proposal centred on their choice forG and subgroupsA andB.
The group G is taken to be the braid group Bn on n strings which has presentation
Bn =
〈
σ1, σ2, . . . , σn−1
∣∣∣ σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1
σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2
〉
.
Let l and r be integers such that l + r = n, and define subgroups
A = 〈σ1, σ2, . . . , σl−1〉 , B = 〈σl+1, σl+2, . . . , σl+r−1〉 .
The braid group is an attractive choice of platform, since there is an efficient normal
form for group elements and group multiplication and inversion can be carried out
efficiently.
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However, the cryptosystem is not fully specified: besides choosing the values
of n, l and r, one must decide how to sample elements g ∈ G, a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
Since the groups G, A and B are infinite, it is not obvious how this should be done.
The following key agreement protocol due to Anshel, Anshel and Goldfeld [3]
has an advantage over the Ko et al. protocol: commuting subgroups A and B are
not needed.
Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld Key Agreement Protocol
Let G be a nonabelian group, and let elements a1, . . . , al, b1, . . . , bm ∈ G be public.
To create a shared key, Alice and Bob proceed as follows:
1. Alice selects a word x in a1, . . . , al and sends bx1 , . . . , b
x
m to Bob.
2. Bob selects a word y in b1, . . . , bm and sends a
y
1, . . . , a
y
l to Alice.
3. Alice computes xy. Bob computes yx.
4. The shared key is the commutator [x, y] := x−1y−1xy.
Note that Alice and Bob can both compute the shared commutator: Alice can pre-
multiply xy by x−1 and Bob can premultiply yx by y−1 and then compute the in-
verse: [x, y] = (y−1yx)−1. Anshel et al. also proposed using braid groups as a plat-
form for the protocol. Note again that the scheme is not fully specified: one needs
to state how elements ai, bj are chosen and how Alice and Bob generate words x, y.
Picking Elements at Random
The two aforementioned schemes leave open specification details as to how one
samples elements from an infinite group such as a braid group. Note that the pro-
tocols work equally well for finite groups, in which case one can choose elements
uniformly at random. But for infinite groups, the meaning of the word random is
unclear, and one needs to specify precisely how group elements are sampled. Let
G = 〈X|R〉 be a finitely presented group. One common method to select elements
from G is to choose at random a sequence of integers j1, . . . , jl (from some finite
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subset of Z) and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ l, select uniformly at random a generator xi ∈ X .
The ‘random’ element xj11 · · ·xjll is then output.
The process of selecting group elements for both the Ko et al. scheme and the
Anshel et al. scheme, turns out to be critical for their security. We elaborate on this
point in Section 1.5.
1.3 Replacing Conjugation
The Ko et al. scheme uses conjugation in place of exponentiation in the Diffie–
Hellman Protocol, but there are many other alternatives. For example, one can
define ga = φ(a)ga and gb = φ′(b)gb for any fixed functions φ : A → A and
φ′ : B → B (including the identity maps) and the scheme would work just as
well. More generally, we may replace a and φ(a) by unrelated elements from A.
Since the papers of Ko et al. and Anshel et al. there have been many proposals
based on variants of the Conjugacy Search Problem, such as the Decomposition
Search Problem and the Twisted Conjugacy Search Problem. Myasnikov et al. [67]
provide a discussion on these problems.
1.4 Symmetric Schemes
Group theory has mainly been used in proposals of public key cryptosystems and
key establishment schemes, but has also been used in symmetric cryptography.
One example is the block cipher PGM based on the symmetric group; we discuss
the scheme in Chapter 4. In general, a block cipher (such as DES or AES) may be
regarded as a set S of permutations on the set of all blocks, indexed by the key. The
question as to whether S is in fact a group has an impact on the cipher’s security in
some situations: if the set is a group, then encrypting a message twice over using
the cipher with different keys would be no more secure than a single encryption.
However, computing the group generated by a block cipher is often very difficult.
For instance, it is known that the group generated by the DES block cipher is a
16
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subgroup of the alternating group A264 [95], with order greater than 256 (and thus
S for DES is not a group [18, 25]); however little more is known about its structure.
Block ciphers are often built as iterated constructions of simpler key-dependent
permutations known as round functions, and one can study properties of the per-
mutation groups generated by these round functions. It has been shown, for in-
stance, that the round functions of both DES and AES block ciphers are even per-
mutations; furthermore it can be shown that these generate the alternating groups
A264 and A2128 , respectively [83, 95, 96].
Hash function design is another area of symmetric cryptography where groups
have been used in an interesting way. Ze´mor [98] proposed using walks through
Cayley graphs as a basis for hash functions; the most well-known concrete proposal
from this idea is a hash function of Tillich and Ze´mor [92]. We discuss this hash
function in Chapter 3.
1.5 Cryptanalysis
In this section we outline techniques developed to demonstrate the insecurity of
many group-based schemes.
In 1969, Garside [32] gave the first algorithm to solve the Conjugacy Problem in
the braid group Bn. The question of efficiency of Garside’s method laid dormant
until the late 1980’s. Since then there has been a great deal of research, significantly
motivated by cryptographic applications, into finding a polynomial time solution
to the Conjugacy Problem. Given two braids x, y ∈ Bn, Garside’s idea is to con-
struct finite subsets (so called summit sets) Ix, Iy of Bn such that x is conjugate to
y if and only if Ix = Iy. An efficient solution to the Conjugacy Problem via this
method would also yield an efficient solution to the Conjugacy Search Problem
(and hence render protocols based on the braid Conjugacy Search Problem theo-
retically insecure). However, for a given braid x, Garside’s summit set Ix may be
exponentially large. The challenge has thus been to prove a polynomial bound on
the size of a suitable invariant set associated with any given conjugacy class. Re-
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finements to the summit set method (such as the super summit set, ultra summit set,
and reduced super summit set methods) have been made over the years, but a poly-
nomial bound remains elusive. Recent focus has been on an efficient solution to
each of the three types of braids: periodic, reducible or pseudo-Anasov, according
to the Nielsen–Thurston classification [5, 6, 7].
For the purposes of cryptography however, one need not efficiently solve the
Conjugacy Search Problem in order to break a braid-based cryptosystem: one is
free to use the specifics of the protocol being employed. An algorithm need work
only on a significant proportion of cases, and heuristic algorithms have proven
quite successful.
Indeed, Hofheinz and Steinwandt [43] used a heuristic algorithm to solve the
Conjugacy Search Problem for braid groups with very high success rates. Their
attack is based on the observation that representatives of conjugate braids in the
super summit set are likely to be conjugate by a permutation braid, which has a
particularly simple structure. Their attack demonstrates inherent weaknesses of
both the Ko et al. protocol and the Anshel et al. protocol for random instances,
under suggested parameters. Around the same time, several other powerful lines
of attack were discovered, which we now mention.
Length Based Attacks. Introduced by Hughes and Tannenbaum [45], length based
attacks provide a neat probabilistic way of solving the Conjugacy Search Problem
in certain cases. Suppose one is given an instance of the Conjugacy Search Problem
in Bn. So one is given braids x, y−1xy and want to find y. Let l : Bn → Z be a
suitable length function on Bn (for example, the length of the normal form of an
element). If one can write y = y′σi for some i, where y′ has a shorter length than y,
then l(σiy−1xyσ−1i ) should be strictly smaller than l(σjy
−1xyσ−1j ) for j 6= i. So i can
be guessed, and the attack repeated for a smaller instance y′ of y. The success rate
of this probabilistic attack depends on the specific length function employed. For
braid groups, there are a number of suitable length functions that open up this line
of attack. Garber et al. [31] and Myasnikov and Ushakov [65] provide convincing
18
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attacks on both the Ko et al. and Anshel et al. protocols using this approach.
Linear Algebra Attacks. The idea behind this attack is quite simple: take a lin-
ear representation of the braid group and solve the Conjugacy Search Problem us-
ing linear algebra in a matrix group. There are two well-known representations
of the braid group: the Burau representation (unfaithful for n ≥ 5) and the faith-
ful Lawrence-Krammer representation. Hughes [44] and Lee and Lee [46] provide
convincing attacks on the Anshel et al. protocol using the Burau representation,
and Cheon and Jun [19] provide a polynomial time algorithm to break the Ko et al.
protocol using the Lawrence-Krammer representation.
1.6 Discussion
Many suggestions have been made to improve the security of the schemes dis-
cussed in this chapter. Themes range from changing the underlying problem (and
instead investigating problems such as the Decomposition Problem, the Braid Root
Problem, the Shifted Conjugacy Problem and more) to changing the platform group
(Thompson’s group, polycyclic groups and others have been suggested). Further-
more, cryptographers have created other cryptographic primitives based on the
Conjugacy Search Problem, such as authentication schemes and signature schemes.
However, there are no known cryptographic primitives based on any of these ideas
that convincingly survive the aforementioned attacks.
On the bright side, group-based cryptography has motivated some natural ques-
tions for the group theorist, in particular the study of generic properties of groups.
For example, Myasnikov and Ushakov [66] proved that pure braid groups PBn
satisfy the strong generic free group property: for any generating set of PBn, when
any k elements are chosen ‘randomly’ (as discussed above) they freely generate a
free group of rank k generically.
We will see more examples of this interplay between cryptography and group
theory throughout this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Matrix-Based Key Establishment
Protocols
This chapter is concerned with the security of key establishment protocols using
matrix groups. There have been many such proposals made over the years, some
of which may be seen as generalisations of protocols based on cyclic groups to
a matrix group setting. The first such example is due to Odoni, Varadharajan and
Sanders [68], who suggested generalising the Discrete Logarithm Problem to matrix
groups and proposed a matrix version of the Diffie–Hellman Protocol. However,
Menezes and Wu [63] demonstated a probabilistic polynomial time reduction for
the DLP for GLn(Fq) to the DLP over small finite extension fields of Fq. More recent
examples include proposals by Alvarez et al. [2] and Climent et al. [22], which were
successfully cryptanalysed by Gonza´lez Vasco et al. [34] and Climent et al. [23]
respectively. In this chapter we add to the cryptanalytic literature by cryptanalying
several matrix-based key establishment protocols. Our exposition is based on the
papers [13, 64].
We begin with a matrix-based key transport protocol by Baumslag, Camps,
Fine, Rosenberger and Xu from 2006 [9]. In fact, their proposal is more general and
several platform groups were suggested, but we consider only their matrix group
proposal. We cryptanalyse this scheme in a very strong sense. We show that for
practical parameter sizes a passive adversary can feasibly recover the session key
after observing just one run of the protocol. We find a better attack if two or more
runs of the protocol are observed. Our techniques reduce the problem of breaking
the scheme to a sequence of feasible Gro¨bner basis computations.
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Next we cryptanalyse two recently proposed matrix-based key agreement pro-
tocols, due to Habeeb, Kahrobaei and Shpilrain [41], and due to Romanczuk and
Ustimenko [76]. These schemes both fail due to straightforward linear algebra at-
tacks.
Finally we discuss Stickel’s key agreement scheme [86], which was successfully
cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GLn(Fq) is used as a platform [80]. Shpil-
rain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n× n matrices defined
over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a
more general method of generating keys, involving polynomials of matrices over
R. When R = Fq, we show that these variants of Stickel’s scheme are susceptible
to a linear algebra attack. We discuss other natural candidates for R, and conclude
that until a suitable ring is proposed, the variant schemes may be considered inse-
cure.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.1 we cryptanalyse the scheme
of Baumslag et al. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we cryptanalyse the schemes of Habeeb,
Kahrobaei and Shpilrain, and Romanczuk and Ustimenko. In Section 2.4 we crypt-
analyse variants of Stickel’s scheme.
2.1 The BCFRX Scheme
We begin by describing a matrix-based key transport protocol by Baumslag, Camps,
Fine, Rosenberger and Xu from 2006 [9], which we refer to as the BCFRX scheme.
The protocol assumes that Alice and Bob a priori share some secret information,
namely their long-term secret key. The goal of the protocol is for Alice and Bob
to establish a session key for subsequent cryptographic use. To achieve this, Bob
selects the session key and sends it to Alice in three passes, as follows.
Let G be a finitely presented group. Let A and B be two commuting subgroups
of G (so AB = BA for all A ∈ A and B ∈ B). The group G is made public and the
subgroups A and B form Alice and Bob’s long-term secret key. Then:
1. Bob selects a session key K ∈ G and elements B,B′ ∈ B. He sends C :=
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BKB′ to Alice.
2. Alice selects elements A,A′ ∈ A and sends D := ACA′ = ABKB′A′ to Bob.
3. Since A and B commute, we have that ABKB′A′ = BAKA′B′. Bob sends
E := B−1DB′−1 = AKA′ to Alice.
4. Alice computes K = A−1EA′−1.
One can think of this protocol as Shamir’s ‘no-key’ Protocol (see Chapter 1),
with the operation of multiplying on the left and right by a group element replacing
the exponentiation operation.
There was no detailed discussion of security of the protocol in [9], but we need
to specify a security model and what it means to break the protocol, in order to
cryptanalyse it. We will consider the weakest possible notion of security: the pas-
sive adversary model. So we will regard the protocol as broken if we can demon-
strate the existence of an adversary that can feasibly compute the session key, after
eavesdropping on one or more runs of the protocol.
Baumslag et al. suggested several platform groups to serve for G. But we con-
centrate on their only matrix group proposal: G = SL4(Z), the group of invertible
4×4 matrices of determinant 1 over the integers. It was proposed that the commut-
ing subgroups A and B should be constructed as follows. Writing I2 for the 2 × 2
identity matrix, define the subgroups U and L of G by
U =
SL2(Z) 0
0 I2
 and L =
I2 0
0 SL2(Z)
 . (2.1.1)
Let M ∈ SL4(Z) be a secret matrix known only to Alice and Bob. Then we define
A = M−1UM and B = M−1LM. (2.1.2)
We may thus view the long-term secret key as the matrix M .
The protocol is not yet fully specified. It remains to specify how the long-term
secret keyM is chosen, and how Alice and Bob select elements fromA andB. It was
stated in [9] that elements are chosen randomly fromA and B, and we presume that
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the matrix M is chosen in a similar fashion from G = SL4(Z). But since the group
G and its subgroups A,B are infinite, the meaning of the word random is unclear
in this context. Any practical cryptanalysis will depend on the details of how these
random choices are made; however the cryptanalysis we give below will work for
any efficient method for making these random choices that we can think of.
In any fully specified implementation of the protocol, there exists an integer
Λ such that the entries of all matrices generated in the protocol lie in the interval
(−Λ/2,Λ/2). Since the standard way to represent a 4 × 4 integer matrix of this
form uses approximately 16 log2 Λ bits, it is natural to think of log2 Λ as the security
parameter of the scheme.
A Cryptanalysis
Our cryptanalysis proceeds in three stages. In Stage 1, we argue that integer com-
putations may be replaced by computations modulo p for various small primes p.
In Stage 2 we show that knowledge of a matrix N of a restricted form allows a pas-
sive adversary to compute any session key transmitted under the scheme. Finally,
in Stage 3, we show that this matrix N may be computed in practice. None of these
stages is rigorous (though Stage 2 may be made so), but the stages all work well in
practice.
Stage 1: Working Modulo p
Suppose an adversary wishes to discover a session key K. Since the entries of K lie
in the interval between −Λ/2 and Λ/2, it is enough to find K mod n for any n > Λ.
Indeed, this is how we approach our cryptanalysis. We will show that in practice
one may efficiently compute K mod pi for small primes pi of our choice. (We are
thinking of pi as a prime of between 80 and 300 bits in length: in some sense quite
large, but in general smaller than Λ.) We run this computation for several different
primes pi until
∏
pi > Λ. Setting n =
∏
pi, we can then appeal to the Chinese
remainder theorem to calculate K mod n = K.
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We write this more precisely as follows. Let T be a fully specified version of the
BCFRX protocol, with SL4(Z) as a platform. For a prime p, let Zp be the integers
modulo p. Let Tp be the BCFRX protocol under the platform group G = SL4(Zp),
defined as follows. We identify the subgroups U and L defined by (2.1.1) with their
images in SL4(Zp). Let the subgroups A and B be chosen to be of the form (2.1.2)
for some matrix M ∈ G chosen uniformly at random. Let Alice and Bob select all
elements fromA and B uniformly and independently at random. This makes sense
since G is finite. We use Tp to model the protocol T taken modulo p. This model
is not quite accurate: for example, it is almost certain that when M ∈ SL4(Z) is
chosen according to the method specified in T , the distribution of M mod p will
not be quite uniform in SL4(Zp). But for all ways we can think of in which T can be
specified, the protocol Tp is a good model for T taken modulo p (in the sense that
an adversary that succeeds in practice to recover the session key generated by Tp
will also succeed in practice to recover K mod p when presented with the matrices
from a run of the protocol T ). Note that an adversary has great freedom in choosing
p, which makes the reduction to Tp difficult to design against. The fact (see below)
that the session key for Tp can be feasibly computed in practice shows that T is
insecure.
Stage 2: Restricting the Long-Term Key
We consider the protocol Tp over SL4(Zp) defined above. From now on, let us write
an arbitrary 4 × 4 matrix Z in block form as Z =
(
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
)
, for the obvious 2 × 2
submatrices Zij of Z.
The following lemma shows that there are many equivalent long-term keys for
the protocol Tp.
Lemma 2.1. Let M ∈ SL4(Zp) be the long-term key shared by Alice and Bob, and define
subgroups A and B by A = M−1UM and B = M−1LM . Let N ∈ GL4(Zp) be any
matrix such that N−1UN = A and N−1LN = B. If N is known, then any session key
can be efficiently computed by a passive adversary.
24
2.1 THE BCFRX SCHEME
PROOF. An adversary is presented with matrices C, D and E that are transmitted
as part of the protocol. We have that C = BKB′, D = ABKB′A′ and E = AKA′
for some unknown matrices A,A′ ∈ A and B,B′ ∈ B. Suppose that the adversary
is also able to obtain a matrix N satisfying the conditions of the lemma. Since
A,A′ ∈ A we may write A = N−1RN and A′ = N−1R′N for some unknown
matrices R,R′ ∈ U . Similarly we may write B = N−1SN and B′ = N−1S′N for
some unknown matrices S, S′ ∈ L.
Define a matrix K ′ by K ′ = NKN−1. Define matrices C ′, D′, E′ by
C ′ := NCN−1 = NBKB′N−1 = SK ′S′,
D′ := NDN−1 = NABKB′A′N−1 = RSK ′S′R′ and
E′ := NEN−1 = NAKA′N−1 = RK ′R′.
Note that the adversary can compute C ′, D′ and E′.
Using the fact that S, S′ ∈ L and R,R′ ∈ U , we may write
C ′ =
 K ′11 K ′12S′22
S22K
′
21 S22K
′
22S
′
22
 ,
D′ =
R11K ′11R′11 R11K ′12S′22
S22K
′
21R
′
11 S22K
′
22S
′
22
 and
E′ =
R11K ′11R′11 R11K ′12
K ′21R′11 K ′22
 .
Clearly K ′11 is known to the adversary, since K ′11 = C ′11. Moreover, K ′22 is known
since K ′22 = E′22.
To compute K ′12, compute a matrix X such that XD′12 = C ′12 (note there may
be more than one such X if K ′12 is noninvertible). This implies XR11K ′12 = K ′12,
since S′22 is invertible. Thus an adversary can compute XE′12 = K ′12. Similarly, to
compute K ′21, compute a matrix Y such that D′21Y = C ′21. This implies K ′21R′11Y =
K ′21 and an adversary can compute E′21Y = K ′21.
Once K ′ is known, the session key K may be recovered since K = N−1K ′N .
This completes the proof.
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Let Mat2(Zp) be the set of 2× 2 matrices over Zp. Let I ⊆ Mat2(Zp) be defined
by
I =

1 0
0 1
 ,
1 0
0 0
 ,
0 0
0 0
 .
We say that N ∈ GL4(Zp) is of restricted form if N11, N22 ∈ I.
Lemma 2.2. For any long-term key M used in the protocol Tp, there is a matrix N of
restricted form satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2.1. Moreover, for an overwhelming
proportion of long-term keysM , we may impose the condition thatN11 = N22 = I2, where
I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix.
PROOF. Let f : Mat2(Zp) → GL2(Zp) be a function such that f(X)X ∈ I for all
X ∈ Mat2(Zp). Such a function f certainly exists: it can be derived from a standard
row reduction algorithm.
Define
H :=
f(M11) 0
0 f(M22)
 and N := HM.
The definition of H means that N11, N22 ∈ I, and so N is of restricted form.
Also, any matrix
H ∈
GL2(Zp) 0
0 GL2(Zp)

has the property that H−1UH = U and H−1LH = L. So
N−1UN = M−1H−1UHM = M−1UM = A
and similarly B = N−1LN . So the main statement of the lemma is proved. To see
why the last statement of the lemma holds, note that for an overwhelming propor-
tion of long-term keys M we have that M11 and M22 are invertible. The function f
maps any invertible matrix to its inverse, and so N11 = N22 = I2 in this case.
Stage 3: Computing the matrix N
We may compute an equivalent long-term keyN of restricted form as follows. After
eavesdropping on a run of the protocol, we know the matrices C,D, and E. Also,
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the matrix N of restricted form must satisfy the equations
NDN−1 = RNCN−1R′, (2.1.3)
NDN−1 = SNEN−1S′, (2.1.4)
NN−1 = I4, (2.1.5)
for unknown matrices R,R′ ∈ U , S, S′ ∈ L. Since N is of restricted form we have
N11, N22 ∈ I. There are thus only 9 possibile combinations for N11 and N22, so we
may perform a trivial exhaustive search to find the right combination. (In practice
we would first try N11 = N22 = I2, since this holds with overwhelming probabil-
ity.) We assign variables x1, . . . , x8 for the remaining unknown entries of N , and
x9, . . . , x24 for the unknown entries of N−1.
Expanding (2.1.3) and (2.1.4), we find
(NDN−1)22 = (NCN
−1)22, (NDN
−1)11 = (NEN
−1)11. (2.1.6)
This gives us 4 + 4 = 8 quadratic equations in the xi, i = 1, . . . , 24. Adding the 16
quadratic equations from (2.1.5), we have a system of 24 quadratic equations in 24
unknowns and expect a Gro¨bner basis calculation to reveal N . If we eavesdrop on
a second run of the protocol, we learn 8 new equations (from (2.1.3) and (2.1.4)) and
expect to compute N more easily.
Experimental results
Over 1,000 trials in Magma on a Intel Core 2 Duo 1.86GHz desktop, it took roughly
12 seconds to compute each Gro¨bner basis for a random 300-bit prime. In all our
experiments, twenty three of the basis elements had the form xi + fi(x24) for i =
1, . . . , 23,where fi is a polynomial of degree 5. The final basis element was a degree
6 polynomial in x24. Thus in all our cases we had a maximum of six possibilities
for a matrix N of restricted form satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2.1.
If we eavesdrop on a second run of the protocol, we can add 8 new equations
to our system. A Gro¨bner basis calculation then reveals a unique value for N . We
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can run the attack for different primes pi of our choice until
∏
pi > Λ and use the
Chinese remainder theorem to calculate K.
We conclude that the BCFRX scheme is insecure when SL4(Z) is used as a plat-
form. Implementation details of our attack are given in the Appendix.
2.2 The HKS Scheme
Next we turn our attention to a key agreement protocol proposed by Habeeb,
Kahrobaei and Shpilrain [41], which we refer to as the HKS scheme.
LetH andQ be two groups and let φ : Q→ Aut(H) be a homomorphism, where
Aut(H) denotes the automorphism group of H . The semidirect product H oφQ of H
and Q is defined as the group {(h, q) : h ∈ H, q ∈ Q}with group operation
(h, q)(h′, q′) = (hφ(q)h′, qq′).
For the HKS scheme we let A be a group and let B be an abelian group. Let
A,B,Aut(B), a ∈ A, b ∈ B,n ∈ N be public. To create a shared key, Alice and Bob
proceed as follows:
1. Alice selects an embedding ψ : A→ Aut(B) and sends to Bob
(x1, x2) := (bψ(a)(b)ψ(a
2)(b) . . . ψ(an−1)(b), an) = (b, a)n ∈ B oψ A.
2. Bob selects an embedding φ : A→ Aut(B) and sends to Alice
(y1, y2) := (bφ(a)(b)φ(a
2)(b) . . . φ(an−1)(b), an) = (b, a)n ∈ B oφ A.
3. Alice computes b−1y1 := y, followed by
kA =
n−1∏
i=1
ψ(ai)(y) =
n−1∏
i=1
n−1∏
j=1
ψ(ai)φ(aj)(b).
4. Bob computes b−1x1 := x, followed by
kB =
n−1∏
i=1
φ(ai)(x) =
n−1∏
i=1
n−1∏
j=1
φ(ai)ψ(aj)(b).
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We require that Alice and Bob pick ψ and φ so that ψ(a)φ(a) = φ(a)ψ(a). If this is
done, Alice and Bob have computed a shared key k = kA = kB .
Before discussing the choice of platform group, we note the following simpli-
faction to the scheme. Alice does not need to send (x1, x2) to Bob, but only x, since
Bob uses only x to derive the key. Moreover an adversary can easily compute x
from (x1, x2), since b is public. Likewise Bob only need send y to Alice. We suppose
from now on that this simplification is in place.
The proposal [41] suggests to let A to be a p-group and B to be an elementary
abelian p-group of order pm. Thus B may be viewed as an m-dimensional vector
space over Fp, and so Aut(B) = GLm(Fp). With this choice of platform groups, we
can view the protocol as follows.
Define f(x) = x+x2+· · ·+xn−1. Let b be anm-dimensional column vector over
Fp. Alice and Bob choose private m×m matrices J and K respectively, using some
method so that f(J) and f(K) commute. In general, and a little more formally,
J = MA(rA) and K = MB(rB) where MA and MB are public algorithms which
take as input random sequences of coin tosses rA and rB respectively (in addition
to the public parameters of the scheme). The algorithms must have the property
that the matrices f(MA(rA)) and f(MB(rb)) commute for all input sequences rA
and rB respectively. The paper [41] suggests some candidates for MA and MB , but
we do not make use of the details of these algorithms in this cryptanalysis.
Alice transmits the column vectorwA = f(J)b to Bob. Bob transmits the column
vector wB = f(K)b to Alice. The common key k is the column vector defined by
k = f(J)f(K)v = f(J)wB = f(K)wA,
the last equality following since f(J) and f(K) commute.
A Cryptanalysis
Suppose an adversary Eve knows the public parameters of the scheme and ob-
serves wA, wB during transmission.
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Let X be any matrix such that Xb = wA, and X commutes with f(L) for all
matrices L that can possibly be generated by Bob. Such a matrix exists since X =
f(J) satisfies these conditions.
Note that the conditions on the unknown entries of X are linear. This is clear
for the condition that Xb = wA. The commutator condition can be expressed as
Xf(L) = f(L)X , for matrices L output by the algorithm MB . To compute the
commutator condition on X , Eve can run MB on some random inputs rE to find
suitable matrices f(L) and impose the necessary conditions Xf(L) = f(L)X on X .
Since these conditions are linear, the number of random inputs rE that is required
before these necessary conditions become sufficient to imply the commutator con-
dition (at least for an overwhelming proportion of runs of the protocol) is very
small.
Since all the conditions onX are linear and easy to find, a suitable matrixX can
be computed efficiently.
We claim that k = XwB . To see this, observe that
XwB = Xf(K)b = f(K)Xb = f(K)wA = f(K)f(J)b = f(J)f(K)b = k.
This means that the adversary can generate the shared key, and the scheme is bro-
ken.
2.3 The RU Scheme
We now cryptanalyse a recent key agreement protocol proposed by Romanczuk
and Ustimenko [76], which we refer to as the RU scheme. The protocol works as
follows.
Let GLn(Fq) denote the group of invertible n×nmatrices over a finite field Fq of
order q, and let Fq[x, y] denote the polynomial ring over Fq in two variables x and
y. Let C,D ∈ GLn(Fq) be two commuting matrices and let d ∈ Fnq . The matrices C
and D and the vector d are made public.
To agree on a shared key, Alice picks a polynomial fA(x, y) ∈ Fq[x, y] and sends
wA = fA(C,D)d to Bob. Likewise Bob picks a polynomial fB(x, y) ∈ Fq[x, y] and
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sends wB = fB(C,D)d to Alice. Alice computes kA = fA(C,D)wB , Bob computes
kB = fB(C,D)wA. Since C and D commute, the same is true for fA(C,D) and
fB(C,D), and so their shared key is the vector k := kA = kB .
It was not fully specified how the matrices C,D and the polynomials fA, fB are
generated. However, the following cryptanalysis applies to any method of genera-
tion.
A Cryptanalysis
Suppose a passive adversary Eve observeswA, wB during transmission, and knows
the public quantities C,D and d. Let X be any matrix such that
XC = CX, XD = DX, Xd = wA.
Note that such a matrix exists, since X = fA(C,D) satisfies these conditions. Since
the conditions on X are all linear, such a matrix is easily found. Eve can then
compute the key as:
XwB = XfB(C,D)d = fB(C,D)Xd = fB(C,D)wA = k.
2.4 Stickel’s Scheme
In 2004, E. Stickel [86] proposed a key agreement scheme using matrices in a cer-
tain subgroup of GLn(Fq). However, M. Sramka demonstrated weaknesses in the
scheme [84], and a full cryptanalysis that works for all of GLn(Fq) was provided by
V. Shpilrain [80]. Shpilrain suggested that a more secure platform for the scheme is
Matn(R), the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n× n matrices defined over
some finite ring R. He also suggested a more general method of generating keys,
involving polynomials of matrices in Matn(R).
In this section we show how, whenR = Fq, Shpilrain’s modifications of Stickel’s
scheme are susceptible to a linear algebra attack. We begin in Subsection 2.4.1
by describing Stickel’s scheme and Shpilrain’s original attack on the scheme. We
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then discuss Shpilrain’s modifications of the scheme in Subsection 2.4.2. In Sub-
section 2.4.3 we offer a cryptanalysis of these modifications when R = Fq. We do
this by modifying Shpilrain’s original linear algebra attack on the scheme, and run
some computer experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of this attack. Our ex-
periments demonstrate that a passive adversary can feasibly compute the shared
key for practical parameter sizes. We close in Subsection 2.4.4 with a discussion on
working over other finite rings R 6= Fq, and conclude that until a suitable ring R is
proposed, the scheme may be considered insecure.
2.4.1 Stickel’s Key Agreement Scheme
Stickel’s key agreement scheme is as follows. Let Z denote the centre of GLn(Fq),
and let A,B,W ∈ GLn(Fq) be fixed public matrices such that AB 6= BA. To agree
on a shared key, Alice and Bob perform the following:
1. Alice randomly picks l,m ∈ N, C1 ∈ Z and sends U = C1AlWBm to Bob.
2. Bob randomly picks r, s ∈ N, C2 ∈ Z and sends V = C2ArWBs to Alice.
3. Alice computes KA = C1AlV Bm. Bob computes KB = C2ArUBs.
Alice and Bob have agreed on a common key K, for
KA = KB = C1C2A
l+rWBm+s.
A simpler key agreement scheme with C1 = C2 = 1 was also proposed by Stickel,
but we will consider the more general version. As a secure parameter for the
scheme, Stickel proposed n = 31. The parameter q was left unspecified, but Sh-
pilrain inferred in his paper that q = 2k for some k ∈ [2, 31] (we will also consider
k = 1). In fact, Stickel proposed that elements A,B,W lie in a particular subgroup
of GLn(Fq). But as we will see, Shpilrain’s attack applies to all matrices in GLn(Fq).
We remark that Sramka’s attack [84] on the scheme concentrated on recovering
a private exponent l,m, r or s, whereas Shpilrain’s more efficient attack works to
compute the key without knowledge of any private exponents.
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Shpilrain’s Attack
Shpilrain noted that for an adversary to compute the key, it suffices upon intercept-
ing the transmitted messages U and V to find invertible matrices X and Y such
that
XA = AX, Y B = BY, U = XWY. (2.4.1)
One can then compute the key as
XV Y = XC2A
rWBsY = C2A
rXWYBs = C2A
rUBs = KB.
The matrix equations (2.4.1) define a nonlinear system of 3n2 equations in 2n2 un-
knowns. But since X is invertible, and XA = AX if and only if X−1A = AX−1,
one can instead set X1 = X−1 and solve the following overdetermined system of
linear equations for X1 and Y :
X1A = AX1
Y B = BY (2.4.2)
WY = X1U.
The key can then be computed as XV Y = KB . A solution to (2.4.2) is guaranteed,
since the equations are always satisfied by X1 = (C1Al)
−1 and Y = Bm, and may
be efficiently found via Gaussian elimination.
2.4.2 Shpilrain’s Modifications
Shpilrain suggested a couple of modifications to Stickel’s scheme to avoid his linear
algebra attack. We describe these modifications now, and name them the power
version and the polynomial version of Stickel’s scheme.
Power Version
Shpilrain first suggested that the public elements A,B,W be noninvertible matri-
ces in Mat(n,R), for some finite ring R. The ring R was not specified, but we will
consider the case R = Fq. The rest of the protocol remains unchanged. As a valid
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attack on the scheme, one can still attempt to find matrices X,Y ∈ Matn(Fq) sat-
isfying (2.4.1) by solving a system of nonlinear equations. However, Shpilrain’s
trick of transforming this into a system of linear equations no longer works in gen-
eral. That is, if one restricts X to be invertible with inverse X−1 = X1 and tries to
solve (2.4.2) (note that in this case Y need not be invertible), one typically finds no
solutions.
Polynomial Version
Stickel’s scheme uses the fact that all powers Al of a matrix A commute. The same
is true of all polynomials
∑
ciA
i in A, for ci ∈ R, where we now assume R is a
finite commutative ring. Again, we consider the case R = Fq. This suggests a
generalisation of the power version of Stickel’s scheme, whereby Alice and Bob
choose polynomials (instead of powers) of the public noninvertible matrices A and
B. Shpilrain suggested that the polynomials chosen by Alice and Bob have zero
constant term, to ensure the resulting matrices are noninvertible (and hence his
linear algebra attack fails).
Note that for any k ≥ n one can express Ak as Ak = ∑n−1i=0 ciAi, since by the
Cayley–Hamilton theorem, A satisfies its own characteristic equation (see e.g. [48],
Page 86). Thus it suffices to consider polynomials of degree at most n − 1. To
fully specify the scheme we therefore assume polynomials are picked uniformly at
random from the set of all polynomials of degree at most n − 1 with zero constant
term. In detail, we have the following scheme.
LetZ denote the centre of Matn(Fq), and letA,B,W ∈ Matn(Fq) be fixed public
noninvertible matrices such thatAB 6= BA. To agree on a shared key, Alice and Bob
perform the following:
1. Alice randomly picks a matrix C1 ∈ Z and polynomials l(x),m(x) ∈ Fq[x] of
degree at most n− 1 with zero constant term. She sends U = C1l(A)Wm(B)
to Bob.
2. Bob randomly picks a matrix C2 ∈ Z and polynomials r(x), s(x) ∈ Fq[x] of
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degree at most n − 1 with zero constant term. He sends V = C2r(A)Ws(B)
to Alice.
3. Alice computes KA = C1l(A)V m(B). Bob computes KB = C2r(A)Us(B).
Alice and Bob have agreed on a common key K, for
KA = KB = C1C2l(A)r(A)Wm(B)s(B).
2.4.3 A Cryptanalysis
We now offer a cryptanalysis of the power variant and polynomial variant of Stickel’s
scheme. Note that the power version is a special case of the polynomial version
with l(x) = xl,m(x) = xm, r(x) = xr, s(x) = xs. We thus concentrate on crypt-
analysing the polynomial version.
There are two main stages of our attack. The first stage involves guessing a
polynomial q(x). We then use this polynomial to construct a system of linear equa-
tions similar to (2.4.2), from which the key may be derived.
Let mA(x) denote the minimum polynomial of A. The polynomial q(x) of inter-
est to an adversary is:
q(x) := gcd(l(x),mA(x)).
We will see later how q(x) is typically easy to guess for an adversary. We first show
how knowledge of q(x) is sufficient to perform a linear algebra attack to recover
the key.
Once q(x) is Found
Suppose an adversary has knowledge of q(x). We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 2.3. Let A ∈ Matn(Fq) and let p(x) ∈ Fq[x]. If gcd(p(x),mA(x)) = 1 then
p(A) is invertible.
PROOF. Since gcd(p(x),mA(x)) = 1, there exist polynomials r(x), s(x) ∈ Fq[x] such
that p(x)r(x)+mA(x)s(x) = 1. SincemA(A) = 0, we have p(A)r(A) = I . Thus p(A)
is invertible. This completes the proof.
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Suppose an adversary has correctly guessed q(x) := gcd(l(x),mA(x)). Note that we
can write l(x) as l(x) = p(x)q(x), where gcd(p(x),mA(x)) = 1, for some polynomial
p(x) ∈ Fq[x]. By the lemma, p(A) is invertible. Now it suffices for an adversary to
find matrices X,Y ∈ Matn(Fq) such that:
XA = AX (2.4.3)
Y B = BY (2.4.4)
q(A)WY = XU (2.4.5)
X is invertible. (2.4.6)
A solution to (2.4.3)–(2.4.6) is now guaranteed, since the equations are always sat-
isfied by X = (C1p(A))−1 and Y = m(B). Note that an adversary does not need to
know l(x) or p(x) to perform this attack. The key may be computed as:
X−1q(A)V Y = X−1q(A)C2r(A)Ws(B)Y
= C2r(A)X
−1q(A)WY s(B)
= C2r(A)Us(B)
= K.
One way to find a solution to (2.4.3)–(2.4.6) is to first solve the system of linear
equations defined by (2.4.3)–(2.4.5). Performing Gaussian elimination will yield
a number of free variables, from which one can search, by running over the free
variables, for an invertible matrix X .
To investigate this attack in more depth, we performed computer experiments
for some reasonable parameters (n, q) = (80, 2), (40, 4), (20, 8). For (n, q) = (80, 2)
we used Sage [78], version 4.3, and for the remaining parameters we used (for ef-
ficiency reasons) Magma [59], version 2.16. For completeness, we ran our experi-
ments on both variants of the scheme; experiments were performed on a 2.6 GHz
dual core Opteron 885 Sun server. Over 100 trials, we recorded the average/maxi-
mum number of free variables found by solving the linear system of equations de-
fined by (2.4.3)–(2.4.5). We also recorded the average/maximum time taken to find
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an invertible matrix X , by naive exhaustive search over the free variables. (This is
clearly not optimal, but sufficient for our purposes.) The results are displayed in
Table 2.1.
#free var. time (mins)
version n q avg max avg max
power
80 2 3 13 407 455
40 4 2 5 9.97 10.18
20 8 2 4 0.41 0.43
poly
80 2 4 13 403 434
40 4 2 7 9.84 10.24
20 8 2 6 0.41 0.44
Table 2.1: Finding an Invertible Matrix X .
It is clear from the results in Table 2.1 that once an adversary has correctly
guessed q(x), it will not take long (for any reasonable parameters) to derive the
key.
Finding q(x)
An adversary needs to know q(x) to perform the above linear algebra attack. We
now show that q(x) is typically easy to guess.
First suppose the power version of the scheme is used. Then q(x) = xi for some
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. There are thus only n choices for q(x). (If q(x) = xn then the matrix
A is nilpotent: Ak = 0 for all k ≥ n, and Alice and Bob will agree on the key
K = 0.) A good cryptanalytic strategy is as follows. First guess that q(x) equals x
and attempt to solve (2.4.3)–(2.4.6). If we find an invertible matrix X , we are done.
Else, we have made an incorrect guess for q(x); instead, keep guessing q(x) = xi, for
i = 2, 3, . . . and attempt to solve (2.4.3)–(2.4.6), until we find an invertible matrix.
In experiments, q(x) has low degree (typically 1 or 2), and over 10,000 trials, the
maximum degree of q(x) found was 13 for (n, q) = (80, 2), 8 for (n, q) = (40, 4), and
5 for (n, q) = (20, 8). Thus after only a small number of guesses, an adversary can
discover q(x) and compute the key.
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Now suppose the polynomial version of the scheme is used. Since x divides
l(x), and A is noninvertible, an adversary knows that x divides q(x). Over 10,000
trials, we recorded the most frequent values for q(x), for the same parameters as
before. The results are displayed in Table 2.2 (a is a generator of F∗q).
(n, q) = (80, 2) (n, q) = (40, 4) (n, q) = (20, 8)
polynomial freq. polynomial freq. polynomial freq.
x 5548 x 7619 x 8748
x(x+ 1) 2280 x(x+ 1) 622 x(x+ a) 171
x(x2 + 1) 598 x(x+ a) 600 x(x+ a5) 166
x(x2 + x+ 1) 479 x(x+ a2) 599 x(x+ a3) 157
x(x3 + 1) 179 x(x2 + x+ 1) 63 x(x+ a4) 157
x(x3 + x2 + x+ 1) 161 x(x2 + ax+ a2) 49 x(x+ 1) 153
x(x3 + x+ 1) 114 x(x2 + a2x+ a) 43 x(x+ a2) 143
x(x3 + x2 + 1) 100 x(x2 + a2) 39 x(x+ a6) 141
Total: 9459 Total: 9634 Total: 9836
Table 2.2: Statistics of q(x).
Experiments indicate that after 8 guesses an adversary has a good chance of
discovering q(x) (94.59% for n = 80, the worst case scenario in our experiments).
In fact, the situation is better than this. Besides q(x), there are 3 other polyno-
mials of interest to an adversary, namely gcd(m(x),mB(x)), gcd(r(x),mA(x)), and
gcd(s(x),mB(x)). Sincem(x), r(x), s(x) are picked independently, they are guessed
just as l(x) is guessed. From knowledge of any one of these polynomials, one
can set up the obvious system of linear equations to derive the key. Moreover,
in our experiments the maximum degree of q(x) was 15 for (n, q) = (80, 2), 7 for
(n, q) = (40, 4), and 5 for (n, q) = (20, 8). Since the matrix A is public, an adversary
can compute its factorised characteristic polynomial, and run over combinations of
its irreducible factors to find q(x).
2.4.4 Discussion
The key to avoiding Shpilrain’s attack is to ensure that gcd(l(x),mA(x)) is nontriv-
ial. Thus in the polynomial version, instead of picking polynomials divisible by x
at random, one could pick polynomials at random until one has a nontrivial factor
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in common with mA(x). However, typically (as one might expect) this nontrivial
factor will be small and hence feasibly guessed.
Instead of working over a finite field, Shpilrain suggested working over some
finite ring R. Two obvious candidates for R are R1 = Zn where n = pq is a product
of two primes, and R2 = Z2n . For R1, assuming the factorisation of n is known,
we may compute K mod p and K mod q and use the Chinese remainder theorem
to compute K. Likewise the Chinese remainder theorem applies if one considers
the polynomial ring Fq[x]/(f(x)). For R2 we may compute K mod 2, followed by
K mod 22, and so on all the way up to K = K mod 2n, and derive, at the very least,
partial information about the key.
We conclude that until a suitable ring R is proposed, the variant schemes may
be considered insecure.
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Chapter 3
Tillich–Ze´mor Hash Function
A hash function h : A∗ → G is a function from the set of all strings over some
finite alphabet A to a finite set G. Hash function design is an important and active
area of research; applications include digital signatures, message authentication
codes, and efficient password storage. There are three standard notions of security
for a hash function, namely preimage resistance: given g ∈ G, find a string s such
that h(s) = g, second preimage resistance: given a string s, find a string t such that
h(s) = h(t), and collision resistance: find two strings s and t such that h(s) = h(t).
In 1994, Tillich and Ze´mor [92] designed the following hash function. Let G be
the group SL2(F2n) of 2× 2 matrices of determinant 1 with entries in the finite field
F2n . Let α be an element of F2n not contained in any proper subfield, and define
S = {s0, s1}, where
s0 =
 α 1
1 0
 , s1 =
 α α+ 1
1 1
 .
A binary string b1b2 . . . bm is hashed to the matrix sb1sb2 · · · sbm ∈ G.
Note that it is easy to find a collision for this hash function. For example, the
empty string and the string consisting of |SL2(F2n)| ones both hash to the identity
element. However, the latter string is impractically long (it cannot be written out
in polynomial time), so one is interested in shorter collisions.
The Tillich–Ze´mor hash function is an example of a more general class of hash
functions based on concepts from group theory, originating in work by Tillich and
Ze´mor [91] and Ze´mor [97, 98]. Let A be an alphabet and let G = 〈S〉 be a finite
group, with |A| = |S|. Let φ : A → S be a set bijection and define a function
h : A∗ → G by sending a string a1 . . . am to the group element φ(a1) · · ·φ(am). For
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applications, one is interested in the binary alphabet, so we assume S = {s0, s1}.
Since its design, several partial cryptanalytic results for the Tillich–Ze´mor hash
function have been discovered. This culminated in the recent work of Grassl, Ilic´,
Magliveras and Steinwandt [40], who devised an efficient method to find short
collisions of length 2n + 2 by constructing certain palindromic bitstings. Based on
this attack, an efficient preimage-finding algorithm was then constructed by Petit
and Quisquater [70].
The cryptanalysis of Grassl et al. crucially depends on the characteristic of the
underlying field and the specific generators s0, s1. It is natural to explore the fol-
lowing questions. Can we produce a secure hash function, that in particular avoids
the attack of Grassl et al. by replacing the underlying finite field F2n by another
finite field Fq? We say any such hash function is of TZ-type. Can we produce a
secure hash function by changing our generators s0 and s1, with or without chang-
ing the underlying field? We say any such hash function is of SL2-type. Can we
produce a secure hash function by changing the group G? We say that such hash
functions are group-based. To answer these questions, we need to understand how
far the Grassl et al. attack generalises to these settings. We also need to understand
generic collision-finding algorithms: attacks that can be applied to all group-based
hash functions.
This chapter contains the following results. We first present generic collision-
finding algorithms for SL2-type hash functions. The algorithms work by succes-
sively hashing into smaller and smaller subgroups, until one lands in an abelian
subgroup (which could be the trivial group). Once inside an abelian group, colli-
sions are easily constructed. The algorithms provide collisions of length roughly
2(log2 q)
2 in time and space complexity O(√q). Although (to the author’s knowl-
edge) the algorithms have not appeared in print before, they were clearly known to
the designers of the hash function, since the choice of platform group renders the
approach to finding collisions infeasible. Moreover, the algorithms are somewhat
naive, employing a general meet-in-the-middle approach. Having said this, we use
commutator calculus to find a simplification of the algorithms when the underlying
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field has characteristic 2. This method finds collisions of length roughly 2n(n+ 1),
but still runs in exponential time.
Next we demonstrate that the attack by Grassl et al. does not extend in a straight-
forward manner to TZ-type hash functions over fields of odd characteristic. We
then provide a method for finding short collisions of length roughly 4 log2 q for TZ-
type hash functions that is independent of the characteristic of the underlying field.
However, the algorithm has the same complexity as generic attacks: O(√q).
The chapter is organised as follows. In Subsection 3.1 we discuss previous work
on the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function. In Subsection 3.2 we outline our collision-
finding algorithms. In Subsection 3.3 we discuss Grassl et al.’s attack and provide
a method for finding short collisions for hash functions of TZ-type. We end in
Subsection 3.4 with a summary of collision-finding algorithms.
3.1 Previous Work
There has been a significant amount of research on group-based hash functions. We
provide a brief survey of the literature.
Group-based hash functions date back to work by Tillich and Ze´mor [91] and
Ze´mor [97, 98]. There is good motivation for choosing G = SL2(F2n) as a platform
group. In general, one may view the process of computing the hash function as
taking a walk in the Cayley graph CS(G) of G with respect to the generating set
S = {s0, s1}. Hence security notions take on a graph theoretical interpretation. For
example, finding a collision in the hash function is equivalent to finding a cycle
in CS(G). Thus the security of group-based hash functions depends on (but is not
obviously equivalent to) the hardness of the representation problem: given a finite
group G with generating set S, find a short word w on S such that w = 1 in G.
The Cayley graph CS(G) displays some nice security properties. For exam-
ple, one can show that the distribution of hashes of length l tends to uniformity
as l tends to infinity. Also, the (directed) girth of CS(G) is larger than n, which
protects against small modifications of a bitstring. Another reason for choosing
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G = SL2(F2n) is efficiency: computing a hash amounts to fast arithmetic in F2n . A
detailed discussion is given in [92].
Prior to the choice of G = SL2(F2n), Tillich and Ze´mor considered the platform
group SL2(Zp) with generators 1 1
0 1
 ,
 1 0
1 1
 .
However, the hash function was shown to be insecure due to a so called density
attack. The attack works by efficiently finding a matrix U ∈ SL2(Z) that reduces to
the identity matrix modulo p, and can also be expressed as a short word on s0, s1;
details are given in [98]. The choice of platform group G = SL2(F2n) avoids this
attack. Charles and Pieprzyk [21] derived conditions on the polynomial defining
F2n which lead to short collisions, but Abdukhalinov and Kim [1] showed that
the conditions hold with very low probability if a randomly chosen irreducible
polynomial is selected to define the field. Abdukhalinov and Kim also introduced a
generalisation to arbitrary finite fields (what we are calling TZ-type hash functions)
by letting G = SL2(Fq) and using the generators
t0 =
 α −1
1 0
 , t1 =
 α+ 1 −1
1 0
 .
Moreover, they demonstrated that this hash function displays similar security prop-
erties to the original Tillich–Ze´mor construction. Geiselmann [33] considered a dis-
crete logarithm approach to finding collisions, but his method produces imprac-
tically long collisions. Steinwandt et al. [85] considered a particular subgroup at-
tack, but this may be avoided by a suitable parameter choice. Petit et al. [73] con-
structed a generic collision-finding algorithm (and also considered finding preim-
ages). However, their algorithm runs in exponential time. Thus prior to the attack
of Grassl et al. (which we discuss later) and Petit and Quisquater’s follow up work
to find preimages [70], the hash function remained essentially unbroken.
We mention briefly a couple of notable variants of the Tillich–Ze´mor hash func-
tion. They work similarly to the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function, and are based on
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taking walks in certain expander graphs. Charles, Goren and Lauter [20] con-
sidered basing a hash function on LPS expander graphs, and Petit, Lauter and
Quisquater [71] investigated Morgenstern expander graphs as a suitable platform.
However, the underlying representation problem turned out not be as difficult as
first thought [72, 93].
3.2 Collision-Finding Algorithms
We now describe our generic collision-finding algorithms for SL2-type and group-
based hash functions.
3.2.1 Collisions for SL2-Type Hash Functions
Let G = SL2(Fq), and let h be the associated hash function (using any generators).
We present two algorithms, Algorithm A and Algorithm B, for finding collisions for
SL2-type hash functions that work for any parameter choice. They do not depend
on the generators used or the characteristic of the underlying field. In Algorithm
A we fix a particular subgroup chain of G and use a meet in the middle approach
to hash into successive subgroups. Collisions may be formed once we hash into an
abelian subgroup of G. This approach may be seen as a straightforward extension
of Petit et al.’s generic attack [73], which we first describe. In Algorithm B we do
not fix a subgroup chain ahead of time.
Petit et al. attack. The most successful completely generic attack to date is that of
Petit et al. [73]: a preimage to the identity is found as follows.
1. Find N strings mi such that (1 0)h(mi) = λi(1 0).
2. Find {ei} such that
∏
λeii = 1 and
∑ |ei| is not too large.
3. Let m′i be the concatenation of mi with itself ei times. Construct
d = m′1|| · · · ||m′N .
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4. Let d′ = d||d. Then h(d′) = 1.
We note that although Petit et al. were considering the case p = 2, one trivially ex-
tends this attack to arbitrary characteristic p by concatenating d with itself p times
in step 4 above (and hence their attack is completely generic). How good is this ap-
proach? Step 1 is achieved via a meet in the middle approach with time complexity
O(√q). We can approximate the length of theN strings to be roughly log2 q. A solu-
tion to step 2 is provided by fixing a generator g for F∗q and solving N discrete loga-
rithms λi = gαi . One then finds a suitable set {ei} by solving
∑
αiei ≡ 0 mod q− 1,
using the LLL algorithm. Taking N = n, one expects to find collisions of length
roughly 2np(log2 q).
Algorithm A. Consider the subgroup chain 1 < K < H < G, where
H =

 a b
0 a−1
 : a, b ∈ Fq, a 6= 0
 , K =

 1 b
0 1
 : b ∈ Fq
 .
The first step of our algorithm finds two strings whose hash values lie in the sub-
group H . Note that the index of H in G is q + 1. We use a meet in the middle
approach as follows:
• Generate and store approximately√q strings v and distinct cosets
h(v)−1H .
• Generate strings u until h(u)H equals some stored value h(v)−1H .
• Return vu.
We repeat this process to obtain two different strings x and y whose hash value lies
in H .
The next step is to hash into the subgroup K. Note that K has index q− 1 in H .
We use h(x) and h(y) as generators of H , and repeat the above process to find two
strings s and t that hash into K. (Note that if h(x) and h(y) do not generate H , then
they generate a proper subgroup H ′ of H . One can then apply the same procedure
to H ′.) A collision is given by h(st) = h(ts), since K is an abelian subgroup of G.
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Heuristically, one expects x and y to have length approximately log2 q. Hence
one expects to find collisions of length roughly 2(log2 q)
2. The time complexity of
this algorithm is O(√q). In terms of memory, the algorithm has space complexity
O(√q) provided one has an efficient encoding of the cosets. An efficient encoding
of the cosets of H in G is given by the bijection G : H → Fq ∪ {∞}, where a b
c d
H 7→
 ac−1 if c 6= 0∞ if c = 0.
Similarly, the cosets of K in H may be encoded via the bijection
H : K → F∗q a b
0 a−1
K 7→ a.
Algorithm B. Instead of fixing a subgroup chain for G as in Algorithm A, we aim
to hash into any conjugate subgroup of H followed by any conjugate subgroup
of K (note that any conjugate subgroup of K is abelian in G). There are many
conjugate subgroups of H and K in G, so one might expect this approach to find
shorter collisions than Algorithm A.
The first step is to find two elements in a conjugate subgroup of H . An element
g ∈ G lies in a conjugate subgroup of H if and only if it has an eigenvalue in Fq. It
is straightforward to check this condition (e.g. one could check for reducibility of
the characteristic polynomial of g). A birthday attack works as follows:
• Generate and store approximately √q strings v subject to the condition that
h(v) has an eigenvalue λ ∈ Fq. Store the eigenvector associated with λ (as a
projective point).
• Generate strings u until an eigenvector of h(u) equals an eigenvector of h(v)
(up to scalar multiples), for some stored v.
• Return u, v.
Thus h(u) and h(v) lie in the same conjugate subgroup of H .
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The next step is to find two strings whose hash value lies in a conjugate sub-
group of K. Suppose h(u) and h(v) have an eigenvalue λ1 and λ2 respectively (we
assume, as is likely, that h(u) and h(v) do not have the same eigenvalues). To hash
into a conjugate subgroup ofK, we seek a short wordw on {λ1, λ2} such that w = 1
in F∗q . We again employ a meet in the middle attack to solve this:
• Generate approximately√q words x on {λ1, λ2}. Store x−1.
• Generate words y on {λ1, λ2} until y = x−1 for some stored x−1.
• Return xy.
Now we have an element in a conjugate subgroup of K. It is easy to generate more
elements in the same subgroup since we are concerned only with the combination
of λi, and not their arrangement in the product of x and y above. One may then
form collisions as in Algorithm A, since we are inside an abelian subgroup.
We note that Algorithm B has the same complexity as Algorithm A.
Remark. We remark that the mi satisfying the condition in step 1 of Petit et al.’s
attack are precisely the lower triangular matrices, and if one considers right eigen-
vectors instead, one gets upper triangular matrices, i.e. H . Also note that h(d) in
step 3 lies in an abelian subgroup K ′ of G. Since the order of the concatenation of
the m′i is irrelevant, one easily finds a different string d
′ 6= d such that h(d′) ∈ K ′. A
collision is then given by h(d)h(d′) = h(d′)h(d).
3.2.2 A Simplification in Characteristic 2
In characteristic 2, there is a simplification to our algorithms to produce collisions.
We provide an exposition for Algorithm A, but it also applies to Algorithm B and
Petit et al.’s algorithm.
Suppose we have found 2 strings (via the meet in the middle approach) whose
hash values u and v lie in H . We can construct a collision based on certain com-
binations of uv and vu as follows. Let k = u−1v−1uv be the commutator of u and
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v. Then k ∈ K. Treating K as the vector space Fn2 , define a linear map φ on K by
φ(k′) = (vu)−1k′(vu). Then a collision is determined by the minimum polynomial
mφ(x) of φ. For example, suppose mφ(x) = x2 + x+ 1. Then a collision is given by
uvuvuv = vukvukvuk
= vuvuφ(k)vuφ(k)k
= vuvuvuφ2(k)φ(k)k
= vuvuvu.
In general, since mφ(x) has degree at most n, we expect to find collisions of length
2(n + 1) log2 q = 2n(n + 1). This method only seems to work in characteristic 2,
since there is no obvious way to deal with non-binary coefficients of mφ(x).
3.2.3 Collisions for Group-Based Hash Functions
Algorithm A extends in a straigtforward manner to group-based hash functions.
Let 1 = G0 < G1 < . . . < Gd = G be a chain of subgroups of G, and let ki
be the index of Gi−1 in Gi. The goal is to find a preimage of the identity element
of G, from which collisions may be formed. The meet in the middle approach
used in Algorithm A is performed iteratively on the subgroup chain down to the
identity subgroup (provided one has an efficient encoding of the cosets). One finds
a bitstring that hashes to the identity, with expected length approximately
d∏
i=1
log2 ki.
The complexity of this approach is governed by the largest index ki, so the algo-
rithm has complexity O(√max{ki}).
3.3 Short Collisions for TZ-Type Hash Functions
In this section we outline Grassl et al.’s attack on the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function
and show that it does not extend to TZ-type hash functions in a straightforward
manner. We then provide a method for finding short collisions for TZ-type hash
functions.
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3.3.1 Grassl et al.’s Attack
Before describing the attack we need a couple of definitions. Let V denote the set
of finite bitstrings and let h : V → G be the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function. The length
of a string v = b1 . . . bm is |v| := m. The reversal of a string v = b1 . . . bm is defined
as vr := bm . . . b1. A string v is a palindrome if v = vr.
The attack works as follows. Firstly, the generators s0 and s1 are conjugated by
s0. So we have new generators c0 = s0 and c1 = s−10 s1s0, where
c0 =
 α 1
1 0
 , c1 =
 α+ 1 1
1 0
 .
Since conjugation preserves collisions (that is, any collision found based on the
generators c0, c1 is also a collision based on the generators s0, s1), it suffices to find
collisions using the symmetric generators c0 and c1. The next step to their attack
is to consider the lifting map H : V → SL2(F2[x]), which is defined similarly to h
except that the matrix images lie over the polynomial ring F2[x] instead of Fq. They
consider the map
ρ : V → F2[x]2×2
v 7→ H(0v0) + H(1v1),
and show that if v is an even length palindrome then ρ(v) =
 a2 a2
a2 0
 for some
polynomial a. The task of finding collisions is now reduced to finding a such that
a2 ≡ 0 modulo the polynomial defining Fq, for then h(0v0) = h(1v1) is a collision.
A very elegant solution to this problem is found by considering maximal length
chains in the Euclidean algorithm, from which short collisions of length 2n+ 2 are
constructed.
We want to know to what extent Grassl et al.’s attack generalises. The follow-
ing lemma shows that their attack does not extend to TZ-type hash functions in a
straightforward manner.
For the remainder of this section, we let G = SL2(Fq) and work with the nat-
ural generators t0 and t1 defined in Section 2 (note that in characteristic 2 these
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are precisely the generators used by Grassl et al.). We let h be the associated hash
function.
Lemma 3.1. Let v ∈ V be a palindrome and let h(v) =
 a b
c d
. Then
(i) h(v) =
 a b
−b d
 .
(ii) If Fq does not have characteristic 2 then h(0v0) 6= h(1v1).
PROOF. For part (i), we proceed by induction on the length of v ∈ V . If |v| = 1 then
h(v) is t0 or t1, and by inspection both t0 and t1 have the desired form. Assume the
result holds for odd length bitstrings, so h(v) =
 a b
−b d
 and |v| is odd. Then
direct calculation gives
h(βvβ) =
 a(α+ β)2 + 2b(α+ β)− d −(aα+ aβ + b)
aα+ aβ + b −a
 ,
which has the desired form. The case for even length bitstrings is identical. Hence
by induction part (i) of the lemma holds.
For part (ii), since v is a palindrome we have that h(v) =
 a b
−b d
, by part
(i). Note that
h(0v0)− h(1v1) =
 −2aα− a− 2b a
−a 0
 .
Hence for h(0v0) = h(1v1) to hold in odd characteristic, we require a = 0. This in
turn implies b = 0. But this contradicts the fact that h(v) ∈ SL2(Fq).
3.3.2 Short Collisions for TZ-Type Hash Functions
We now illustrate a way to find short collisions for TZ-type hash functions. We
begin with a lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let v ∈ V and let h(v) =
 a b
c d
. Then
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(i) h(vr) =
 a −c
−b d
 .
(ii) h(v)− h(vr) =
 0 b+ c
b+ c 0
 .
(iii) h(0vvr1)− h(1vvr0) =
 0 a2 − c2
a2 − c2 0
 .
(iv) h(0vrv1)− h(1vrv0) =
 0 a2 − b2
a2 − b2 0
 .
(v) h(vv)− h(vrvr) =
 0 (a+ d)(b+ c)
(a+ d)(b+ c) 0
 .
PROOF. For part (i), we proceed by induction. If |v| = 1 then h(v) is t0 or t1, and
by inspection both t0 and t1 have the desired form. Assume the result holds for
|v| = k. Then a bitstring of length k+1 may be written as vβ. By the inductive step,
v has the desired form, i.e. h(v) =
 a b
c d
 and h(vr) =
 a −c
−b d
. Direct
calculation gives
h(vβ) =
 a(α+ β) + b −a
c(α+ β) + d −c

and
h(βvr) =
 a(α+ β) + b −c(α+ β)− d
a −c
 ,
and we see that the matrices have the desired form. Hence by induction part (i)
of the lemma holds. Parts (ii) to (vi) of the lemma may be seen by simple matrix
calculations.
The lemma provides good heuristic reasons to expect to find collisions of length
of the order log2 q. By parts (ii) and (v) of Lemma 3.2, to find a collision it suffices to
find a non-palindrome v such that either b+ c = 0 or a+ d = 0 in h(v). By parts (iii)
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and (iv), to find a collision it suffices to find any bitstring v ∈ V such that a = ±b or
a = ±c in h(v) =
 a b
c d
.
The following proposition and corollary show that we can find collisions of
length roughly 4 log2 q.
Proposition 3.3. Let u = b1 . . . br be a bitstring that hashes into H , i.e. h(u) ∈ H . Let
v = b1brbr−1 . . . b2. Then h(v) ∈ H . Moreover, bitstrings uv and vu hash into K, i.e.
h(uv), h(vu) ∈ K.
PROOF. Let h(b1) =
 x+ β −1
1 0
 and h(b2 . . . br) =
 a b
c d
, where β = b1.
Then
h(u) = h(b1)h(b2 . . . br) =
 (x+ β)a− c (x+ β)b− d
a b
 .
Since h(u) ∈ H we have that a = 0 and hence −c = b−1. Thus
h(u) =
 b−1 (x+ β)b− d
0 b
 .
Now,
h(v) = h(b1)h(br . . . b2) =
 x+ β −1
1 0
 a −c
−b d
 (by lemma 2.3(i)),
=
 b (x+ β)b−1 − d
0 b−1
 (since a = 0 and −c = b−1).
Thus h(v) ∈ H . Moreover, one sees that
h(uv) =
 1 (x+ β)(1 + b−2)− 2b−1d)
0 1
 .
h(vu) =
 1 (x+ β)(1 + b2)− 2b−1d)
0 1
 .
Thus h(uv), h(vu) ∈ K.
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Corollary 3.4. Let u = b1 . . . br be such that h(u) ∈ H . Let v = b1br . . . b2. Then
bitstrings uvvu and vuuv hash to the same value.
PROOF. By Proposition 3.1, h(uv) and h(vu) lie in K. But K is an abelian subgroup
of G. Hence h(uvvu) = h(uv)h(vu) = h(vu)h(uv) = h(vuuv).
3.4 Summary
We close with a summary of the various collision-finding algorithms. The algo-
rithms described in Subsection 3.2.1 are completely generic; they work for any gen-
erators and any finite field. Although they find collisions of reasonable length, the
algorithms have exponential running time. Fixing the natural generators t0 and t1,
we can find shorter collisions, but again the algorithm (call this Algorithm C) is
inefficient, since we cannot efficiently hash into the subgroup H .
We summarise these algorithms in Table 3.1 indicating which algoriths are spe-
cific to characteristic 2 or specific to the natural generators. For completeness in-
clude the trivial collision-finding algorithm of writing down |SL2(Fq)| ones. Grassl
Algorithm Exp. Coll. Length Cxty (t) gen. spc? char. spc?
Trivial max{q + 1, 2p} O(1) no no
Grassl et al. 2 log2 q O(n3) yes yes
Petit et al. 2np(log2 q) O(√q) no no
A 2(log2 q)
2 O(√q) no no
B 2(log2 q)
2 O(√q) no no
C 4 log2 q O(√q) yes no
Table 3.1: Collision-Finding Algorithms
et al.’s attack is specific to both the natural generators and the characteristic of the
underlying field. We do not have much confidence that changing the generators
(but staying in characteristic 2) would lead to an increase in security. Certainly
such a scheme would be less natural (and probably less efficient) than the original
proposal. Moving to odd characteristic naturally avoids Grassl et al.’s attack, as
the results in this chapter indicate. But the loss in efficiency may be too much to
overcome if the design it to rival more traditional hash functions.
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Chapter 4
MST3 Public Key Cryptosystem
Logarithmic signatures (or group factorisations as they are also known) find applica-
tions in numerous areas of mathematics and computer science, for example cod-
ing theory, combinatorics and cryptography [90]. They first appear in the crypto-
graphic literature in connection with Permutation Group Mappings (PGM), a sym-
metric cipher invented by Magliveras [54]. The ideas behind PGM have inspired
several public key cryptosystems based on logarithmic signatures, most notably
the family of MST cryptosystems [50, 57].
In this chapter we explore the role of logarithmic signatures in cryptography.
Our main result is a cryptanalysis of a public key cryptosystem MST3, proposed
by Lempken, Magliveras, van Trung and Wei [50].
We begin in Section 4.1 with the definition of a logarithmic signature, a gen-
eral method of construction, and a small example. In Section 4.2 we provide an
overview of the use of logarithmic signatures in cryptography, before moving on to
discuss constructions for elementary abelian 2-groups in Section 4.3: this is moti-
vated as they occur as part of the private key for MST3. We provide a cryptanalysis
of MST3 in Section 4.4; our exposition follows [12]. After the publication of [12],
Svaba and van Trung [89] published a paper with modifications to MST3, resulting
in a revised version of the cryptosystem. We close the chapter with some comments
on this paper in Section 4.5.
4.1 Definitions, Constructions, Examples
Let G be a finite group, S ⊆ G a subset of G and s a positive integer. For all 1 ≤ i ≤
s, let Ai = [αi1, . . . , αiri ] be a finite sequence of elements of G of length ri > 1, and
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let α = [A1, . . . , As] be the ordered sequence of Ai. We say that α is a cover for S if
any g ∈ S can be written as a product g = g1 · · · gs, where gi = αiki ∈ Ai. If such a
decomposition is unique for every g ∈ S, then α is said to be a logarithmic signature
for S. The type of a cover α is the vector (r1, . . . , rs), the sets Ai are called blocks,
and the length of α is l(α) :=
∑s
i=1 ri.
Given an element g ∈ S and a cover α of S, obtaining a factorisation g =
α1k1 · · ·αsks associated with α seems to be a hard problem in general. Indeed,
in some situations the problem is a discrete logarithm problem. For example, let
G be generated by an element g of large order, and define Ai+1 = [1, g2
i
]. Let
S = {ga | 0 ≤ a ≤ 2s}. Then the ith bit of the discrete logarithm of h ∈ S is equal to
1 if and only if ki = 2 in the factorisation h = α1k1 · · ·αsks .
If a factorisation can be efficiently computed for every g ∈ S, we say that α is a
tame cover for S; otherwise α is a wild cover for S.
Let α be a cover for S of type (r1, . . . , rs), let ki be integers, 1 ≤ ki ≤ ri, and let
q =
∏s
i=1 ri. Consider the maps λα and θα defined by
λα : Zr1 × . . .× Zrs −→ Zq
(k1, . . . , ks) 7−→
∑s
i=1(ki
∏i−1
j=1 rj),
and
θα : Zr1 × . . .× Zrs −→ G
(k1, . . . , ks) 7−→ α1k1 · · ·αsks .
Note that λα is a bijection, and both λα and λ−1α are efficiently computable. Define
the map
α˘ : Zq −→ G
k 7−→ θα(λ−1α (k)).
Given g ∈ S, computing an s-tuple (k1, . . . , ks) such that g = α1k1 · · ·αsks is equiv-
alent to computing an element of θ−1α (g). It follows that α is tame if and only if an
element of α˘−1(g) can be efficiently computed for every g ∈ S.
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Constructing Logarithmic Signatures
A natural way to construct a logarithmic signature for a finite groupG is to choose a
subgroup chain 1 = G0 < G1 < · · · < Gs = G and let Ai be a complete set of (left or
right) coset representatives for Gi−1 in Gi. Clearly α = [A1, . . . , As] is a logarithmic
signature for G. Call such a logarithmic signature a transversal logarithmic signature.
We can construct new logarithmic signatures for G by applying any sequence of
the following operations to α:
• Permute elements within a block.
• Replace a block Ai by a translate g ·Ai or Ai · g for some g ∈ G.
• Amalgamate blocks, i.e. replace two blocks Ai and Ai+1 by the single block
Ai ·Ai+1 := {gh | g ∈ Ai, h ∈ Ai+1}.
Let Bi = t−1i−1Aiti for some ti ∈ G, and let β = [B1, . . . , Bs]. Then β is a logarithmic
signature for G. Note that by taking
(t0, t1, t2, . . . , ts) = (1, α
−1
11 , (α11α21)
−1, . . . , (α11α21 · · ·αs1)−1),
we have that the first element in each block of β is the identity (we use this fact to
simplify our cryptanalysis of MST3 in Subsection 4.4.4).
An Example
Let us consider a small example and construct some logarithmic signatures forG =
F32, the elementary abelian 2-group of order 8. We may view the group operation
as XOR, and represent elements as binary vectors of length 3, so
G = {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111}.
Consider the subgroup chain
{000} < G1 < G2 < G,
where G1 = {000, 001} and G2 = {000, 001, 010, 011}. We construct a transversal
logarithmic signature α for G as follows. First consider A1, a complete set of coset
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representatives for G0 in G1. Clearly A1 = G1 (and in general A1 will always be a
group for such a construction). We have some freedom in choosing A2 and A3, so
let us pick A2 = [010, 001], A3 = [011, 100]. Then α = [A1, A2, A3] is a transversal
logarithmic signature for G of type (2, 2, 2). Suppose we replace A1 by the translate
A′1 = A1 · (111) = [111, 110]. Then β = [A′1, A2, A3] is a logarithmic signature for G
of type (2, 2, 2), but it is not transversal. Suppose we amalgamate blocks A2 and A3
of β to a single block A′2 = [001, 110, 010, 101]. Then γ = [A′1, A′2] is a logarithmic
signature for G of type (2, 4).
4.2 Logarithmic Signatures in Cryptography
Logarithmic signatures were first used in cryptography by Magliveras [54] to con-
struct a symmetric cipher known as Permutation Group Mappings (PGM). The idea
of the cipher is simple. Let G be a permutation group of degree n and let α, β be
transversal logarithmic signatures for G of length polynomial in n. Such logarith-
mic signatures are tame [56], hence α˘−1 and β˘−1 are efficiently computable. En-
cryption of a message m ∈ Zq is given by c = β˘−1α˘(m) and decryption is given by
α˘−1β˘(c) = m.
Although PGM satisfies some nice algebraic and statistical properties (such as
robustness, scalability and a large key space), fast implementation becomes an is-
sue, making it a rather inefficient cipher compared with more traditional block ci-
phers. An attempt was made to improve PGM by letting the platform group be a
2-group, but again speed remains an issue [17].
However, PGM has inspired much research into designing public key cryp-
tosystems based on logarithmic signatures. Notable proposals include MST1 and
MST2, invented by Magliveras, Stinson and van Trung [57].
The MST1 cryptosystem is theoretical in nature, and relies on efficient genera-
tion of wild logarithmic signatures α for a permutation groupG. The main problem
with MST1 is constructing wild logarithmic signatures that are typically hard to in-
vert. Magliveras et al. [57] had the idea of restricting α to be totally non-transversal,
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that is no block of α forms a coset of a non-trivial subgroup of G. However, Bohli
et al. [15] constructed instances of totally non-transversal logarithmic signatures
that are in fact tame. Further weaknesses were pointed out by Gonza´lez Vasco and
Steinwandt [38], and it remains unclear how to generate secure instances of MST1.
Key generation is also a problem for MST2 [57]. This cryptosystem employs
certain covers called meshes. A cover α = [A1, . . . , As] for S is an [s, r]-mesh if |Ai| =
r, and, if there are ag different factorisations for g ∈ S with respect to α, then the
probability distribution {ag/rs : g ∈ S} is approximately uniform.
LetG andH be finite groups and let f : G→ H be a surjective homorphism. Let
α be an [s, r]-mesh for G and let β = f(α) be an [s, r]-mesh for H . The public key
for MST2 is (G,H,α, β) and the private key is the homomorphism f . Encryption
of a message m ∈ H is given by selecting a random R ∈ Zrs and computing y1 =
α˘(R), y2 = β˘(R), y3 = my2. The ciphertext is c = (y1, y3). Decryption is given by
computing y2 = f(y1) followed by y3y−12 = m.
MST2 is also theoretical in nature, and suffers from a lack of specification: the
groups G and H were not specified, and secure instances of this scheme are not
known. A critique of MST2 is given in [38].
Related public key proposals based on logarithmic signatures have met similar
fates. For example, schemes by Birget, Magliveras and Wei [10], and Qu and Van-
stone [75] have been cryptanalysed by Gonza´lez Vasco et al. [35] and Blackburn et
al. [14] respectively.
Recently, Lempken, Magliveras, van Trung and Wei [50] designed a new public
key cryptosystem called MST3. A practical instance of the cryptosystem was pro-
posed based on Suzuki 2-groups. Partial cryptanalytic results were discovered by
Magliveras et al. [58] and Gonza´lez Vasco et al. [36]. We will discuss their work
later in Subsection 4.4.3, but we state now that crucial to the security of the scheme
is how one generates logarithmic signatures for elementary abelian 2-groups. Thus
before discussing MST3, we review known constructions of logarithmic signatures
for elementary abelian 2-groups. This constitutes the next section.
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4.3 Elementary Abelian 2-Groups
Let Z be an elementary abelian 2-group of order 2m. We identify Z with Fm2 and
view elements as binary vectors of length m, with XOR acting as group operation.
In this section we describe known methods of constucting logarithmic signatures
for Z . We aim to be consistent with notation: α = [A1, . . . , As] denotes a loga-
rithmic signature or cover for a general group G, and β = [B1, . . . , Bs] denotes a
logarithmic signature for an elementary abelian 2-group.
Canonical Logarithmic Signatures
The following construction is by Magliveras, Svaba, van Trung and Zajac [58]. Ran-
domly partition X = {1, 2, . . . ,m} into disjoint sets C1, C2, . . . , Cs. Define integers
di by di = |Ci|, and let ri = 2di . Let B1, B2, . . . , Bs be subgroups of Z where Bi
consists of the 2di vectors that are all zero except possibly the positions indexed
by integers in Ci. Clearly β = [B1, B2, . . . , Bs] is a logarithmic signature of type
(r1, r2, . . . , rs). Call such a construction a canonical logarithmic signature. Note these
logarithmic signatures form a very special class: all blocks Bi are subgroups of Z .
Further note that canonical logarithmic signatures are attractive in terms of storage
on a computer, as one only need store a minimal generating set for each subgroup.
We have the following.
Lemma 4.1. Let β = [B1, . . . , Bs] be a canonical logarithmic signatures. Then β is tame.
PROOF. Let z = b1k1b2k2 . . . bsks be any element in Z . We give an algorithm to find
k1, . . . , ks. First scanB1, . . . , Bs to find the partition sets C1, . . . , Cs. To determine ki
set zi to be equal to z but with all bit positions X \ Ci of z set to zero. Then zi ∈ Bi
and ki is given by the position of zi ∈ Bi.
Amalgamated Transversal Logarithmic Signatures
A more general method of construction is as follows. Let
1 = Z0 < Z1 < · · · < Zs = Z
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be a subgroup chain of Z . Let Bi be a complete set of coset representatives for Zi−1
in Zi. Then β = [B1, . . . , Bs] is a transversal logarithmic signature for Z .
We can now derive new logarithmic signatures from β by performing the fol-
lowing elementary operations:
1. Permute elements within a block.
2. Permute the blocks.
3. Replace Bi by a translate Bi · g for some g ∈ G.
4. Amalgamate blocks, i.e. replace two blocks Bi and Bj by the single block Bi ·
Bj := {gh | g ∈ Bi, h ∈ Bj}.
Clearly applying any sequence of these operations results in a new logarithmic
signature for Z . Call such a construction an Amalgamated Transversal Logarithmic
Signature (ATLS). Note that one obtains a canonical logarithmic signature from an
ATLS by taking Bi = Zi/Zi−1.
In general, a periodic point of a logarithmic signature α = [A1, . . . , As] is an ele-
ment aij ∈ Ai such that Aiaij = Ai. Clearly if the identity element lies in Ai then it
is a periodic point. A logarithmic signature is nonperiodic if there are no nonidentity
periodic points; otherwise it is periodic. We note the following important properties
that hold for any ATLS.
Lemma 4.2. Let β = [B1, . . . , Bs] be an ATLS. Then β is periodic.
PROOF. The subgroup Z1 has been amalgamated into one of the subsets Bi. It is
not difficult to see that Z1 ⊆ Bi and BiZ1 = Bi, and every (nonidentity) element of
Z1 is a periodic point.
Lemma 4.3. Let β = [B1, . . . , Bs] be an ATLS. Then β is tame.
PROOF. We prove the lemma by induction on the order of Z . The lemma is trivial
when Z has order 1. Assume the lemma holds for all elementary abelian 2-groups
of order smaller than |Z|.
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Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1 ∈ Bi for all i. Let  be a
transversal logarithmic signature, and let  = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ` = β be the sequence
of logarithmic signatures generated when constructing β (so each i is obtained
from i−1 by applying an elementry operation).
There exists z = bij ∈ Z such that Bibij = Bi, by Lemma 4.2. Such an element
may be found efficiently by checking at most
∑s
i |Bi| elements. Let N = {1, z} be
the subgroup generated by z. Define a logarithmic signature β for Z/N by set-
ting Bk = BkN/N (where we remove the redundant elements from Bi so that
Bi has half the size of Bi). Then β is an ATLS; this is shown by the sequence
 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ` = β of logarithmic signatures of Z/N defined using the same
sequence of amalgamation and translation operations as in the construction of β.
Since β is an ATLS, it is tame by our inductive hypothesis and so we may effi-
ciently determine β˘
−1
(xN) for any x ∈ Z . We may efficiently invert β˘ as there are
only two possibilities for β˘−1(x) once β˘
−1
(xN) is known. So β is tame, as required.
Nonperiodic Constructions
A tiling of Z = Fm2 is a logarithmic signature of the form β = [B1, B2]. Nonperi-
odic tilings of Z were shown to exist for all m ≥ 6 by Cohen, Litsyn, Vardy and
Ze´mor [24]. Furthermore, they demonstrate a unique (up to coordinate transfor-
mations) nonperiodic tiling of F62, and explicitly construct nonperiodic tilings for
all m ≥ 7. For odd m their construction is as follows.
Let ν = 2n − 1, n ≥ 3, and let h1, . . . , hν be a sorted list of nonzero elements of
Fn2 . Let pi = (1, 4, 2)(3, 6)(5, 7)(8, 9)(10, 11) · · · (ν − 1, ν) be the permutation on the
set {1, . . . , ν}. Consider A0, A1, B2 ⊂ F2n+12 given by
A0 =

0 h1 · · · hν
0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
 , A1 =

0 0 · · · 0
0 h1 · · · hν
1 1 · · · 1
 ,
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B2 =

0 h1 · · · hν
0 hpi(1) · · · hpi(ν)
0 0 · · · 0
 ,
where elements of A0, A1, B2 are represented as column vectors and 0 denotes the
zero vector of length n. Let B1 = A0 ∪A1. Then β = [B1, B2] is a nonperiodic tiling
of F2n+12 . To see that β is a tiling note that a vector z ∈ F2n+12 can be written uniquely
as z = b1b2 for some b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2 (if the last bit of z is zero then b1 ∈ A0, else
b1 ∈ A1). To see that B1 is nonperiodic, observe that any nonzero vector in A0
summed with any vector in A1 yields a vector not in B1. The nonperiodicity of B2
may be seen by inspection of pi. The case for even m is dealt with similarly. Clearly
such logarithmic signatures are tame.
4.4 The MST3 Cryptosystem
We now come to the main result of this chapter: a cryptanalysis of the MST3 pub-
lic key cryptosystem. In Subsections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3 we describe MST3 and make
some initial observations on its security. We also discuss the cryptanalytic results
of Magliveras et al. [58] and of Gonza´lez Vasco et al. [36]. In Subsection 4.4.4 we de-
scribe a simplification of the cryptosystem. Finally we present our attacks against
MST3 in Subsection 4.4.5.
4.4.1 Description
LetG be a finite non-abelian group with non-trivial centreZ , with the property that
G does not split over Z (so G cannot be written as a direct product G = Z ×H for
some subgroup H). The MST3 cryptosystem works as follows.
Key Generation:
• Generate a tame logarithmic signature β = [B1, . . . , Bs] := (βij) of type
(r1, . . . , rs) for Z .
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• Generate a random cover α = [A1, . . . , As] := (αij) of the same type as β for
a certain (large) subset J ⊆ G.
• Select random elements t0, . . . , ts ∈ G\Z and compute α = [A1, . . . , As] :=
(αij), where Ak = t−1k−1Aktk for k = 1, . . . , s.
• Compute γ := (γij) = (βijαij).
The pair (α, γ) is the public key, while (β, (t0, . . . , ts)) is the corresponding private
key.
Encryption:
A message p ∈ Z|Z| is encrypted as the pair (α˘(p), γ˘(p)) := (y1, y2) (recall that given
covers α, γ, one can efficiently compute the mappings α˘ and γ˘).
Decryption:
The plaintext p can be obtained from the ciphertext (y1, y2) as follows:
• Since y2 = γ˘(p) = β1j1α1j1 · β2j2α2j2 · · ·βsjsαsjs , and the elements βij are in
the centre of G, we have
y2 = (β1j1β2j2 · · ·βsjs)t−10 (α1j1α2j2 · · ·αsjs)ts
= β˘(p)t−10 α˘(p)ts
= β˘(p)t−10 y1ts.
As a result one can compute β˘(p) = y2t−1s y
−1
1 t0.
• Now one can recover p = β˘−1(y2t−1s y−11 t0), since β is tame.
We note that Lempken et al [50] require the random cover α to have the prop-
erty that Ak ⊆ G\Z for k = 1, . . . , s. We have dropped this requirement, since:
the property is not needed for the encryption and decryption algorithms to work
correctly; the property holds with high probability if the elements αij are chosen
uniformly and independently at random; we wish to allow all covers α as valid
private keys for the purposes of our cryptanalysis.
It seems reasonable to assume that the elements of α and the elements ti are
chosen uniformly and independently at random. But the cryptosystem is not yet
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completely specified: a suitable platform groupG needs to be defined, and we need
to specify how to generate the logarithmic signature β. We discuss these issues
next.
4.4.2 A Realisation of MST3
In [50], the authors propose a practical realisation for MST3 using Suzuki 2-groups.
(See Higman [42] for a description of these groups.) Letm ≥ 3 be a natural number,
not a power of 2. Let θ be a non-trivial automorphism of odd order of the finite field
Fq, where q = 2m. The Suzuki 2-groupG of order q2 can be realised as the subgroup
of GL3(q) consisting of the matrices
S(a, b) =

1 0 0
a 1 0
b aθ 1
 .
Thus G = {S(a, b) : a, b ∈ Fq} with centre Z = {S(0, b) : b ∈ Fq}. Multiplication
and inversion in G are given by
S(a, b) · S(x, y) = S(a+ x, b+ y + aθx),
S(a, b)−1 = S(a, aθa+ b).
It follows that all elements in the centre have order 2, while elements not in the
centre have order 4.
Lempken et al [50] impose an extra condition on α when Suzuki 2-groups are
used as a platform for MST3, namely that no two elements of a set Ai should lie
in the same coset of Z . Since this condition holds for an overwhelming proportion
of keys for interesting parameters (and since the condition is not relevant to our
attacks) we ignore it for the sake of simplicity.
The issue of how to generate β is not discussed in depth in [50], but we will
suppose β is constructed as an ATLS. This is most general yet practical method
we know for generating tame logarithmic signatures for Z . Nonperiodic tilings
of type (r1, r2) are too costly in terms of storage. Moreover, it is not clear how a
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general strategy would work to decompose a nonperiodic tiling into a logarithmic
signature of type (r1, . . . , rs) for s > 2.
Again for storage reasons, the number of amalgamation operations in the ATLS
construction has to be kept small: an amalgamation increases the number of ele-
ments we have to store by |Ei||Ej | − (|Ei|+ |Ej |), and so an indiscriminate use of
amalgamation could lead to an exponential storage requirement. From the perspec-
tive of efficiency, generating an ATLS of type (2, 2, . . . , 2) is very attractive (though
this would mean that we are unable to use amalgamation to construct them).
4.4.3 Previous Work
In this subsection, we briefly review previous work addressing the security of
MST3, and make some elementary observations on the system’s security.
In [50], the authors of MST3 provide a brief discussion on the security of the
scheme, and give an attack on the cryptosystem in the passive adversary model
with complexity approximately q2 when Suzuki 2-groups are used, where q =
|Z| = |G/Z|. (Note that q is exponential in the security parameter, so attacks that
are polynomial in q in fact have exponential complexity.)
Magliveras et al [58] provide a better attack with complexity O(q). They only
claim that their attack applies when the Suzuki 2-groups are used as the platform,
but in fact their attack works for any platform group. We provide a similar generic
attack in Section 4.4.4 below, as the first step in our cryptanalysis. Magliveras et al
go on to show that MST3 is insecure whenever β is a canonical logarithmic signa-
ture. (In fact their attack does not work in the interesting special case when di = 1
for all i, as they need that the sum of the vectors in a subspace is zero; our crypt-
analysis will cover this special case.) Note that it is easy to avoid the attack in [58]:
either choose di = 1 for all i, or generate an ATLS as described in Subsection 4.3
(which is very unlikely to be canonical).
The authors of MST3 assume [50, Section 1] that a randomly chosen cover α in
a finite group will (with overwhelming probability) induce a one-way function α˘.
This is a reasonable assumption, but the authors claim (in Section 4.4 of their paper)
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that this assumption is not actually needed to establish the security of MST3 (in a
passive model). Gonzalez Vasco, Perez del Pozo and Taborda Duarte [36] provide
strong evidence that this last claim is false, by showing that when α does not induce
a one-way function, MST3 is insecure unless the quotient |Z|/|J | is large. They
then provide experimental evidence that |Z|/|J | is usually rather small. Gonzalez
Vasco et al also show that a randomised version of MST3 is insecure in the sense of
indistinguishability, even for passive adversaries.
The papers above still leave open the question of whether MST3 is secure in
practice if canonical transversal logarithmic signatures are avoided in the gener-
ation of the private key. The aim of the next section is to provide a practical
cryptanalysis of the MST3 cryptosystem when private keys are generated using
the ATLS method.
We close this section with two elementary remarks on the security of the scheme:
1. Note that although the private key consists of the tame logarithmic signature
β and the s + 1 randomly generated elements {t0, . . . , ts}, the s − 1 elements
t1, . . . , ts−1 are not actually needed: only β and t0, ts are used in the decryp-
tion procedure.
2. Note that any triplet of the form (β, g · t0, g · ts), where g is in the centralizer
of J (in particular, if g ∈ Z), can be used to decrypt the ciphertext. Thus there
are many equivalent private keys.
4.4.4 A Simplification
The aim of this section is to simplify the problem of cryptanalysing MST3: we will
show that it is sufficient to consider a much smaller class of public and private keys
than in the original definition. This simplification works for all suitable platform
groups, not just the Suzuki 2-groups considered above.
Let (α, γ) be a public key for MST3, with (β, (t0, t1, . . . , ts)) the corresponding
private key. Recall that α = [A1, A2, . . . , As] and β = [B1, B2, . . . , Bs], and define
subsets Hi by γ = [H1, H2, . . . ,Hs]. Note that the algorithm for deriving γ from the
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private key implies that
γij = βijt
−1
i−1αijti. (4.4.1)
Define elements pi, qi and zi by setting p0 = q0 = z0 = 1 and for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}
defining
pi =
i∏
k=1
αk1, qi =
i∏
k=1
γk1 and zi =
i∏
k=1
βk1.
Note that (4.4.1) and the fact that the elements βij are central together imply
that
qi =
i∏
k=1
(βk1t
−1
k−1αk1tk) = zit
−1
0 piti. (4.4.2)
Define α′ = [A′1, A′2, . . . , A′s], γ′ = [H ′1, H ′2, . . . ,H ′s] and β′ = [B′1, B′2, . . . , B′s] by
A′i = pi−1Aip
−1
i ,
H ′i = qi−1Hiq
−1
i ,
B′i = zi−1Biz
−1
i .
The following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma 4.4. We use the notation defined above. For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}, the first elements
α′i1, γ
′
i1, β
′
i1 of the sets A
′
i, H
′
i, B
′
i are all equal to the identity. Moreover,
α˘′(x) = α˘(x)p−1s , γ˘′(x) = γ˘(x)q
−1
s and β˘′(x) = β˘(x)z
−1
s .
In particular, β′ is a logarithmic signature for Z , and α′ is a cover for some subset J ′ of G.
Lemma 4.5. Let (α, γ) be a public key for MST3, with (β, (t0, t1, . . . , ts)) the correspond-
ing private key. Define α′, γ′ and β′ as above, and let t′0 = t′1 = · · · = t′s = t0. Then
(α′, γ′) is a public key for MST3, with corresponding private key (β′, (t′0, t′1, . . . , t′s)).
PROOF. Suppose we use α′, β′ and t′0, t′1, . . . , t′s to generate a public key (α′, δ),
where δ = [D1, D2, . . . , Ds], so δij = β′ij(t
′
i−1)
−1α′ijt
′
i. It suffices to show that δ = γ
′.
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But
δij = β
′
ijt
−1
0 α
′
ijt0
= zi−1βijz−1i t
−1
0 α
′
ijt0
= zi−1βijz−1i t
−1
0 pi−1αijp
−1
i t0
= βijzi−1z−1i t
−1
0 pi−1αijp
−1
i t0
= βijβ
−1
i1 t
−1
0 pi−1αijp
−1
i t0.
Equation (4.4.2) implies that t−10 pi−1 = z
−1
i−1qi−1t
−1
i−1 and p
−1
i t0 = tiq
−1
i zi. So
δij = βijβ
−1
i1 z
−1
i−1qi−1t
−1
i−1αijtiq
−1
i zi
= βijqi−1t−1i−1αijtiq
−1
i
by the definition of zi, and since zi is central. But
γ′ij = qi−1γijq
−1
i = qi−1βijt
−1
i−1αijtiq
−1
i
by (4.4.1). Since βij is central, we have that γ′ij = δij , as required.
We define the Restricted OWE problem for MST3 as follows. The input is a
public key (α, γ) for MST3 and a challenge ciphertext (y1, y2). The public key must
have the extra property that αi1 = γi1 = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ s; the corresponding private
key must have the property that t0 = t1 = · · · = ts and also that βi1 = 1 for
1 ≤ i ≤ s. The output is the plaintext p corresponding to the ciphertext (y1, y2).
Theorem 4.6. There is a polynomial time reduction from the OWE problem for MST3
(for general keys) to the Restricted OWE problem for MST3. (Indeed, only one call to the
Restricted OWE oracle is needed.)
PROOF. Let O(α, γ, y1, y2) be an oracle for the restricted OWE problem for MST3.
We show that this oracle can be used to solve the OWE problem for MST3 for gen-
eral keys.
Suppose (α, γ) is an (unrestricted) public key, with corresponding private key
(β, (t0, t1, . . . , ts)). Let (y1, y2) be a challenge ciphertext with corresponding mes-
sage p.
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Suppose we are given (α, γ) and (y1, y2). Define (α′, γ′) as above. Note that α′
and γ′ can be efficiently constructed from α and γ using public information only.
By Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, (α′, γ′) is a public key with corresponding private key
(β′, (t0, t0, . . . , t0)), and these keys satisfy our restrictions. Define y′1 = y1p−1s and
y′2 = y2q−1s . Again, we note that ps and qs are defined using public information, so
y′1 and y′2 can be efficiently computed from the information we are given.
We call the oracle O on (α′, γ′, y′1, y′2), and receive a message p such that
(α′(p), γ′(p)) = (y′1, y
′
2).
Then p is the message we require, since
α˘(p) = α˘′(p)ps = y′1ps = y1p
−1
s ps = y1 and
γ˘(p) = γ˘′(p)qs = y′2qs = y2q
−1
s qs = y2.
4.4.5 A Cryptanalysis
This subsection is concerned with the cryptanalysis of MST3. We first provide an
(exponential) attack that is independent of the underlying platform group G. Next
we outline an approach that works for platform groupsG such thatG/Z is abelian.
Finally, we report on our experiments with implementing these attacks in the case
when G is a Suzuki 2-group.
A Generic Attack
From now on, we assume our public key (α, γ) and corresponding private key
(β, (t0, t1, . . . , ts)) are such that
αi1 = βi1 = γi1 = 1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ s and there exists t ∈ G such that
t0 = t1 = · · · = ts = t.
Theorem 4.6 shows that we may do this without loss of generality.
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The secret logarithmic signature β can be obtained from the public key once t is
known, since
βij = γijt
−1α−1ij t. (4.4.3)
So we may think of the private key of the cipher as being the single group element t.
Define t ∈ G/Z by t = tZ . Let z ∈ Z . Replacing t by tz does not change
the value of the right hand side of (4.4.3), and does not change the output of the
decryption algorithm. So once t is known, the cryptosystem is broken as an equiv-
alent private key can be derived efficiently. A search over all |G/Z| possibilities
for t will therefore break the cipher. This cryptanalysis can be regarded as a gen-
eralisation of the ‘attack on t0’ presented by Magliveras et al [58, Subsection 4.1] in
the case of Suzuki 2-groups. Note that this attack will in general be exponential in
the security parameter, but is clearly much more efficient than a naive exhaustive
search over possible private keys.
A More Efficient Approach
We would like to break the cipher much more efficiently than the attack in the
previous subsection. We are most interested in the case whenG is a Suzuki 2-group.
However, in this subsection we consider a more general situation that includes
these groups: the case when G/Z is abelian.
Let t′ ∈ G be a guess for the value of t. (Of course, it is only the coset t′Z that
matters.) Define
bij = γij(t
′)−1α−1ij t
′
for all i and j. (Note that bij can be computed without knowledge of the private
key.) Define a cover b = [B1,B2, . . . ,Bs] for some subset J of G by
Bi = [bi1, bi2, . . . , biri ].
Let q = |Z|, and define the map ω : Zq → G by
ω(x) = γ˘(x)t′−1α˘(x)−1t′
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for all x ∈ Zq. (Note that ω can also be computed without knowledge of the private
key.)
When t ≡ t′ mod Z (so our guess for t′ is correct) we have that b = β and
ω = β˘ = b˘. In particular, when we have guessed correctly:
1. b is a tame logarithmic signature for Z , and
2. ω = b˘.
Lemma 4.7. If the above two conditions are satisfied for a particular guess t′, then
(b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′)) is an equivalent private key for the cipher.
PROOF. Since b is a tame logarithmic signature for Z , the pair (b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′)) is
a valid private key. Let (y1, y2) be the ciphertext obtained as encryption of the
plaintext p under the public key corresponding to the private key (β, (t, t, . . . , t)).
So y1 = α˘(p) and y2 = γ˘(p). Decryption using the key (b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′)) gives us
b˘−1(y2t′−1y−11 t
′) = ω−1(y2t′−1y−11 t
′) = ω−1(γ˘(p)t′−1α˘(p)−1t′) = ω−1(ω(p)) = p,
as required.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that G/Z is abelian. For any choice of t′ we have that b is a cover of
a subset of Z .
PROOF. For any i and j we have that
bijZ = γij(t′)−1α−1ij t′Z = γijα−1ij t′−1t′Z
= γijα
−1
ij t
−1tZ = γijt−1α−1ij tZ = βijZ = Z.
So the elements of the cover b all lie in Z , as required.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose that G/Z is abelian. For any choice of t′ we have that ω = b˘.
PROOF. By an abuse of notation we will identify the sets Zq and Zr1 × . . .×Zrs via
the map λα defined in Subsection 4.1. So we think of the domain of the functions b˘
and ω as being Zr1 × . . .× Zrs rather than Zq.
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We first note that
bi1 = γi1(t
′)−1α−1i1 t
′ = (t′)−1t′ = 1
for all i. In particular,
b˘(x1, x2, . . . , xk, 1, 1, . . . , 1) =
s∏
i=1
bixi =
k∏
i=1
bixi .
Moreover, writing x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk, 1, 1, . . . , 1), we find that
α˘(x) =
k∏
i=1
αixi and γ˘(x) =
k∏
i=1
γixi ,
since αi1 = γi1 = 1.
We will prove the lemma by induction. Let P (k) be the following statement:
ω(x1, x2, . . . , xs) = b˘(x1, x2, . . . , xs) whenever xk+1 = xk+2 = · · · = xs = 1.
The first paragraph of the proof shows that b˘(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1. Moreover, since
γ˘(1, 1, . . . , 1) = α˘(1, 1, . . . , 1) we find that ω(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1. Hence P (0) holds.
Assume, as an inductive hypothesis that P (k − 1) holds. Our assumption that
G/Z is abelian implies that bij ∈ Z for all i and j. Let x1, x2, . . . , xk be fixed. Define
x and x′ by
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk, 1, . . . , 1) and x′ = (x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, 1, . . . , 1).
Then
b˘(x) =
k∏
i=1
bixi = b˘(x
′)bkxk = ω(x
′)bkxk (by our inductive hypothesis)
= γ˘(x′)t′−1α˘(x′)−1t′bkxk
= γ˘(x′)bkxkt
′−1α˘(x′)−1t′ (since bkxk ∈ Z)
=
(
k−1∏
i=1
γixi
)
γkxkt
′−1α−1kxkt
′t′−1
(
k−1∏
i=1
αixi
)−1
t′
= γ˘(x)t′−1α˘(x)t′
= ω(x).
So P (k) is true whenever P (k − 1) is true. By induction, P (s) holds and so the
lemma follows.
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Theorem 4.10. Let G be such that G/Z is abelian. Then (b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′)) is an equiv-
alent private key for MST3 if and only if b˘ : Z|Z| → Z is a bijection whose inverse is
efficiently computable.
PROOF. It is clear that a private key (b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′)) for MST3 must have the prop-
erty that b˘ : Z|Z| → Z is a bijection whose inverse is efficiently computable.
To prove the converse, first note that b is a cover for a subset ofZ , by Lemma 4.8.
We are assuming that b˘ is a bijection whose inverse is efficiently computable, so in
fact b is a tame logarithmic signature for Z . By Lemma 4.9, we have ω = b˘. Hence,
by Lemma 4.7, we find that (b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′)) is an equivalent private key for the
cipher, as required.
So a general approach to finding a private key for MST3 may be described as
follows. We use the fact that b˘ must be a bijection to derive some conditions on
t′. If applying these conditions leads to a small number of possibilities for t′, we
perform an exhaustive search to find a private key that works. If there are still
many possibilities for t′, we choose one at random and hope that b˘−1 is efficiently
computable: the probability that this will be successful will depend on the way
that the logarithmic signature β has been generated. In the next subsection we will
analyse the performance of this attack for Suzuki 2-groups.
Recovering the Key in Practice
We now describe our computer experiments to verify that the method outlined
above works well in practice. All computer experiments were performed using the
mathematics software SAGE [77].
Let m = 81. Our platform group is the Suzuki 2-group over the field Fq, where
q = 2m. The generic attack described in Subsection 4.4.5 requires a search of size
q to succeed: we fix m = 81 so that this generic attack is not feasible. Note that
the public key is already rather long when m = 81: in the most efficient case we
consider (Case 1 below), we need over 19 000 bits to store the non-identity elements
73
4.4 THE MST3 CRYPTOSYSTEM
in the logarithmic signatures α and γ. Our techniques do not seem to depend sig-
nificantly on the automorphism θ in the definition of the Suzuki 2-group, so we fix
θ to be the squaring automorphism in all our experiments.
We construct our logarithmic signature β using the ATLS method discussed in
Subsection 4.3. We wish to generate logarithmic signatures of type (r1, r2, . . . , rs),
where
∏s
i=1 ri = 2
m. Note that the integers ri must be fairly small, as otherwise
the logarithmic signatures we produce cannot be stored efficiently. The precise
method we use to generate β depends on its type: we give explicit details below.
By Theorem 4.6, it is enough to consider logarithmic signatures that have an extra
property: the elements βi1 are all equal to the identity. Our methods for generating
β always produce logarithmic signatures with this property (and no generality is
lost by generating logarithmic signatures in this way).
We follow the approach in Subsection 4.4.5 in our cryptanalysis. In the notation
of that subsection, we begin by deriving conditions that t must satisfy as a conse-
quence of the fact that β is bijective. We then choose t′ at random subject to these
conditions; our attack is successful if we obtain a valid private key after trying a
small number of guesses t′. In our experiments, our attack was always successful.
Recall the notation S(a, b) for an element in the Suzuki 2-group defined in Sub-
section 4.4.2. Our remark at the end of Subsection 4.4.3 shows that we may assume
that t = S(x, 0) where x ∈ Fq is unknown, and so we restrict our guess t′ to be of
the form S(y, 0) for some y ∈ Fq. The conditions on t that we derive are F2-linear
conditions, so it is easy to choose t′ satisfying these conditions at random. The pre-
cise conditions on t we derive will depend on the number of components ri of the
type of β that are equal to 2: when there are many of such components, the con-
ditions we derive are weaker. For this reason, we provide three cases to illustrate
our methods. In Case 1, ri = 2 for all i. In this case we find no conditions on t,
but simply randomly choosing a small number of values for t′ leads to a successful
attack. In Case 2, ri 6= 2 for all i. In this case, we find that every condition we derive
restricts t′ to such a small number of possibilities that a negligible exhaustive search
can be carried out. Case 3, with approximately half of the components of the type
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of β being equal to 2, illustrates an intermediate case. Here, each condition limits
the number of possibilities for t′ significantly (to approximately 240 possibilities).
Very few guesses t′ can satisfy two of these conditions simultaneously, so combin-
ing two conditions allows us to derive an equivalent private key by a negligible
exhaustive search.
Case 1: β has type (2, 2, . . . , 2)
In this case, we assume β consists of 81 blocks of size 2. Such logarithmic signatures
are very attractive from the perspective of efficiency: we only need to store the
81 non-trivial elements in the sets Bi; moreover these elements form a basis of Z
when Z is considered as a 81-dimensional vector space over F2, and computations
with β can be carried out using straightforward linear algebra. (We note that β is
an example of canonical logarithmic signature as defined in [58]; however the attack
described in that paper does not work in this particular case.)
We derive public and private keys for the MST3 cryptosystem as follows. We
randomly choose a generating set {z1, . . . , z81} for Z . Define elements di2 ∈ Fq by
zi = S(0, di2), so the elements di2 form an F2-basis for Fq. Set
β = [B1, . . . , B81], where Bi = {1, S(0, di2)}.
We then generate elements ei2, fi2 ∈ Fq at random, and define
α = [A1, . . . , A81], where Ai = {1, S(ei2, fi2)}.
Let t = S(x, 0) where x ∈ Fq is chosen at random. We construct γ as specified in
the definition of MST3. So we define
γi2 = βi2t
−1αi2t
= S(0, di2)S(x, x
θx)S(ei2, fi2)S(x, 0)
= S(ei2, di2 + fi2 + ei2x
θ + eθi2x) =: S(ei2, gi2),
and set γ = [C1, . . . , C81], where Ci = {1, γi2}.
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no. guesses t′ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
frequency 2829 2111 1429 1048 799 490 374 279 181
no. guesses t′ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
frequency 133 98 66 47 31 26 19 11 5
no. guesses t′ 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
frequency 3 7 7 4 2 1 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Experimental Results for Case 1
Our attack works as follows. Let t′ = S(y, 0) be a random guess for t. We form
b = [B1, . . . ,B81], where Bi = {1, bi2} and bi2 is given by
bi2 = γi2t
′−1α−1i2 t
′
= S(ei2, gi2)S(y, y
θy)S(ei2, ei2
θei2 + fi2)S(y, 0)
= S(0, gi2 + fi2 + ei2y
θ + ei2
θy).
If the set {bi2}81i=1 is linearly independent, then b˘ is a bijection and it follows from
Theorem 4.10 that we have an equivalent private key. If the set is linearly depen-
dent, we repeat this process with another guess t′.
We have implemented this attack for 10 000 random instances of MST3. The
results of this experiment, which took a few minutes to carry out on a standard
PC, are given in Table 4.1. The average number of guesses for t′ before finding an
equivalent private key, was approximately 3.47. Thus the scheme is insecure in this
case.
Case 2: β has type (8, 64, 64, . . . , 64)
We now consider the case when our logarithmic signatures consist of one block of
size 8 and thirteen blocks of size 64.
We construct β as follows. We generate a random basis {z1, . . . , z81} for Z . We
consider the subgroup chain
1 = Z0 < Z1 < · · · < Z27 = Z,
where Zi = 〈z1, . . . , z3i〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 27. We form a transversal logarithmic signature
of type (8, 8, . . . , 8) (with 27 blocks in total), whose ith block is a transversal for Zi−1
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in Zi containing the identity as its first element. We then randomly amalgamate 26
blocks of size 8 in pairs to form 13 blocks of size 64. Reordering the blocks we have
constructed an ATLS β = [B1, B2, . . . , B14] of type (8, 64, 64, . . . , 64) for Z . Define
elements dij ∈ Fq by βij = S(0, dij).
We generate the element t = S(x, 0), the elements αij = S(eij , fij), the elements
γij = S(eij , gij), and the covers α and γ as in Case 1. In particular, the equation
gij = dij + fij + e
θ
ijx+ eijx
θ
holds.
Our attack recovers a private key directly by a small exhaustive search, rather
than guessing an equivalent private key. Lemma 4.2 implies that there exists i and
j such that j ≥ 2 and Bi · bij = Bi. There is only a small number of possibilities for
i and j so (using a negligible exhaustive search) we may assume that a valid choice
for i and j are known. We know that
dij = gij + fij + e
θ
ijx+ eijx
θ. (4.4.4)
Moreover, when Bi · bij = Bi, the equation
dij + dik = dil (4.4.5)
holds for at least |Bi|−2 pairs of indices k, lwhere 2 ≤ k, l ≤ |Bi| and where j, k and
l are distinct. Writing uijkl for uij + uik + uil, equations (4.4.4) and (4.4.5) combine
to give
gijkl + fijkl = eijkl
θx+ eijklx
θ. (4.4.6)
Note that the elements eijkl, fijkl and gijkl are all known (forming part of the public
key (α, γ)), but x is unknown. For a fixed e ∈ Fq, the map
φe : Fq → Fq given by x 7→ eθx+ exθ
is an F2-linear map. Moreover, when e 6= 0, we have that φe has a kernel of size
2. Assuming (as is very likely) that eijkl is non-zero, we find that each equation
of the form (4.4.6) is satisfied by at most two possibilities for x (and these choices
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are easily computed using elementary linear algebra). There are fewer than 218
choices for i, j, k and l. Once these choices are fixed, there are at most 2 values for
x that satisfy equation (4.4.6). So we can recover x by an exhaustive search though
220 possibilities. (For each possibility for x, we can construct b and check to see
whether b˘ is a bijection: this check can be carried out efficiently for an ATLS.)
Note that this attack makes use of the fact that |Bi| > 2 in an essential way: if
|Bi| = 2 then there are no valid choices for j and k. Note also that when we have
a correct value for i and j the same element x will occur at least |Bi| − 2 times as a
solution to (4.4.6) as j and k vary over all possible values: this observation can be
used to recover x more efficiently. Finally, we note that when i is guessed correctly
the set Bi has the property that the product of its elements must be the identity (as
the same is true for any coset of a subgroup of Z of order 4 or more); this property
can be used to find x without the need to guess j, k or l.
We implemented the attack using SAGE on a standard PC, and in each run the
randomly chosen secret value x was returned correctly within 30 minutes. Thus
the MST3 cryptosystem is also insecure in this case.
Case 3: β has type (2, 2, . . . 2, 16, 16, . . . , 16)
Finally, we consider the case when β consists of 41 sets of size 2 and 10 sets of size
16. In this situation, the analogue of equation (4.4.6) does not restrict the number
of possibilities for x sufficiently, and so we combine two equations to recover x.
We construct β by starting with the subgroup chain
1 = Z0 < Z1 < · · · < Z61 = Z,
where each Zi has index 2 in Zi+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 40 and index 4 for 41 ≤ i ≤ 60.
We form a random transversal logarithmic signature for this chain (including the
identity as the first element in each transversal): this logarithmic signature will
consist of 41 sets of size 2 and 20 sets of size 4. We then amalgamate the 20 sets of
size 4 in pairs to form 10 sets of size 16, where the pairing of these sets is chosen
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No. possibilities for x 0 1 2 4 8 16
Freq. (correct indices) 0 579 386 33 2 0
Freq. (incorrect indices) 276 543 170 10 1 0
Table 4.2: Experimental Results for Case 3
at random. The result is an ATLS β = [B1, B2, . . . , B41, B42, . . . , B51] of the type we
are seeking. We then choose t and α, and construct γ, just as before.
Our attack in this case is as follows. Define the subgroup H = 〈B1, . . . , B41〉.
Write βij = S(0, dij), and define V = 〈di2 : 1 ≤ i ≤ 41〉. Note that V has dimension
41 and H = {S(0, v) : v ∈ V }. Clearly the image of [B42, . . . , B51] in Z/H is an
ATLS for Z/H with no blocks of size 2. So we may proceed in the same way as
in Case 2, this time working in the quotient Z/H to derive equations that x must
satisfy modulo V . Using the notation from Case 2, we obtain equations of the form
gijkl + fijkl + V = φeijkl(x), (4.4.7)
where φeijkl is an F2-linear map. On the assumption that eijkl is non-zero, an equa-
tion of this form restricts x to lie in an affine subspace of dimension at most 42, and
so we have reduced the size of an exhaustive search for x to 242 possibilities. But a
correct guess for i means that x satisfies at least |Bi| − 2 ≥ 2 such equations as j, k
and l vary. If we correctly guess two such combinations of j, k and l, we know that
x lies in the intersection of two affine subspaces of dimension at most 42 (namely
the solution sets corresponding to the two equations), and this reduces the number
of possibilities for x to a negligible number. The validity of each possibility for x
can be determined by checking the bijectivity of b˘ as in Case 2.
Implementing these ideas, we generated 1000 random ATLSs forZ/H . For each
ATLS we picked a random pair of equations (4.4.7) where the indices i, j, k and l
have been guessed correctly, and computed the size of the intersection of the two
solution sets. We did the same when the indices have been guessed incorrectly, to
check that the number of possibilities for x is not too large in this case. We record
the results in Table 4.2.
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As Table 4.2 indicates, in either case the number of possibilities for x is small.
There are less than 220 pairs of equations to check, and so we typically expect
(guided by Table 4.2) an exhaustive search for x to be of size 224 at most. (Fur-
thermore, within this search we expect x to occur with a relatively high frequency,
since it appears for every correct pair of equations (4.4.7).) Thus we conclude that
the MST3 cryptosystem is also insecure in this case.
We conclude that until a method for generating secure tame logarithmic signa-
tures is invented, the MST3 cryptosystem is insecure.
4.5 A Revised Version of MST3
After the publication of [12], Svaba and van Trung [89] presented a revised ver-
sion of MST3. The platform group (Suzuki 2-groups) and method of generating
tame logarithmic signatures for Z (ATLS) remain the same, but the encryption and
decryption processes are changed slightly, and there is extra key material. Svaba
and van Trung discuss lower bounds on the workload of known direct atttacks on
the private key, all of which run in exponential time. Methods are described for
efficiently inverting β˘ for an ATLS β for Z , which amount to keeping track of the
elementary operations applied to a canonical logarithmic signature, and reversing
the process.
A chosen plaintext attack (‘Matrix Permutation attack’) is then presented which,
although runs in exponential time, for practical parameter sizes rules out the use of
logarithmic signatures for Z which apply only the elementary operations (1)–(3),
i.e. with no amalgamation. Evidence is then provided that this line of attack is
rather inefficient for general ATLS constructions involving amalgamation. Finally
implementation issues are discussed.
It is natural to ask whether the cryptanalysis described in Section 4.4 of the
original MST3 cryptosystem can be applied to the revised version of MST3, which
we call MSTr3. In this subsection we describe MST
r
3 and give some preliminary
comments as to what extent the foregoing cryptanalysis of MST3 applies to MSTr3.
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The revised version MSTr3 works as follows. We indicate with an asterisk the steps
that differ from the MST3 key generation process.
Key Generation:
• Generate a tame logarithmic signature β = [B1, . . . , Bs] := (βij) of type
(r1, . . . , rs) for Z .
* Generate a homomorphism f : G→ Z .
• Generate a random cover α = [A1, . . . , As] := (αij) of the same type as β for
a certain (large) subset J ⊆ G.
* Select random elements t0, . . . , ts ∈ G\Z and compute α = [A1, . . . , As] :=
(αij), where Ak = t−1k−1Akf(Ak)tk for k = 1, . . . , s.
• Compute γ := (γij) = (βijαij).
The pair (α, γ) is the public key, while (β, (t0, . . . , ts), f) is the corresponding pri-
vate key.
Encryption:
A message p ∈ Z|Z| is encrypted as the pair (α˘(p), γ˘(p)) := (y1, y2) (recall that given
covers α, γ, one can efficiently compute the mappings α˘ and γ˘).
Decryption:
The plaintext p can be obtained from the ciphertext (y1, y2) as follows:
• Since y2 = γ˘(p) = β1j1α1j1 · β2j2α2j2 · · ·βsjsαsjs , and the elements βij are in
the centre of G, we have
y2 = (β1j1β2j2 · · ·βsjs)t−10 (α1j1α2j2 · · ·αsjs)f(α1j1α2j2 · · ·αsjs)ts
= β˘(p)t−10 α˘(p)f(α˘(p))ts
= β˘(p)t−10 y1f(α˘(p))ts.
As a result one can compute β˘(p) = y2t−1s f(α˘(p))
−1y−11 t0.
• Now one can recover p since β is tame.
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The homomorphism f is specified as f(S(a, b)) = S(0, aσ), for some (presum-
ably random) σ ∈ Aut(Z) = GLm(2). Note that if f is the trivial homomorphism
then we have a description of the original MST3 cryptosystem.
Following Subsection 4.4.4 it is straightforward to show a reduction for the
OWE problem for MSTr3 for general keys to the OWE problem for MST
r
3 with key
pairs (α, γ), (β, ti, f) satisfying αi1 = γi1 = βi1 and ti = t0 = t, for 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
In this restricted setting f induces a cover C ′ = (c′ij) = [C
′
1, . . . , C
′
s] of type
(r1, . . . , rs) for some subset of Z , with c′i1 = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
Note the workload of the generic attack of Subsection 4.4.5 has increased, as one
has to guess more key material, namely both t and f . However, just as before we
can guess values t′, f ′ for t, f , define
bij = γij(t
′)−1α−1ij f
′(αij)−1t′,
and arrive at the following.
Theorem 4.11. LetG be such thatG/Z is abelian. Then (b, (t′, t′, . . . , t′), f ′) is an equiv-
alent private key for MSTr3 if and only if b˘ : Z|Z| → Z is a bijection whose inverse is
efficiently computable.
This immediately indicates the insecurity of using logarithmic signatures of type
[2, . . . , 2], as picking random values for t′, f ′ will quickly yield a bijection. Fur-
thermore, suppose αij = S(eij , fij), where eij lie in a subspace Z1 of Z . It seems
relevant that to avoid some attacks (see Subsections 6.1 and 6.2 of [89]) one requires
|Z|/|Z1| to be ‘large’. Thus one can immediately reduce the search for f by consid-
ering only homomorphisms f ′ : G → 〈eij〉. However, the size of Z1 is unspecified
in [89]. From this preliminary analysis, it is not clear what exact security guaran-
tees MSTr3 provides. Moreover the revised scheme is somewhat less natural than
the original MST3 cryptosystem.
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Chapter 5
Closing Remarks
Despite over ten years of strong interest in group-based cryptography, a well stud-
ied candidate for a secure, fully-specified and efficient cryptosystem is yet to emerge.
Can such a platform group be found? We need a candidate group whose elements
can be manipulated and stored efficiently, and an associated problem that is hard
in the overwhelming majority of instances. There has been a great deal of atten-
tion on infinite groups given by a finite presentation (such as braid groups), but
it seems that ‘random’ or ‘generic’ instances of these protocols lead to particularly
simplified atttacks. The case for finite groups is also delicate. Groups with small
linear representations are often problematic, as linear algebra can be used as a line
of attack; groups with many normal subgroups (such as p-groups) are vulnerable
to attacks based on reducing a problem to smaller quotients; groups with permu-
tation representations of low degree are vulnerable to attacks based on the well
developed theory of computational permutation group theory. So great care must
be taken in the choice of group, and the choice of supposedly hard problem.
More generally, we can move beyond the Ko et al. and Anshel at al. schemes,
and ask: is there a secure and efficient key establishment protocol based on group
theoretic ideas? There are regular proposals, but the field is still waiting for a pro-
posal that stands up to long-term scrutiny.
Reflecting on the schemes of Chapter 2, it seems unwise to employ matrix
groups in such key establishment protocols. However, it remains open to explore
other classes of groups for these and similar protocols, for example surface braid
groups as suggested by Baumslag et al. for the BCFRX Scheme.
Concerning the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function, there are several interesting ques-
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tions. Can one find secure generators for the scheme in characteristic 2? Can one
find an efficient attack in odd characteristic? Can one find a more suitable plat-
form group? FInally we mention some interesting problems that have arisen from
analysing cryptosystems based on logarithmic signatures.
Let G be a finite group of order
∏t
j=1 p
aj
j , with pj distinct primes. Let α =
[A1, . . . , As] be a logarithmic signature for G of type (r1, . . . , rs). The length l(α) =∑s
i=1 ri of α is an efficiency measure: it is the number of elements that must be
stored in order to specify a typical logarithmic signature. Naturally one is inter-
ested in minimising l(α) to reduce the key size of cryptosystems involving loga-
rithmic signatures. Since |G| = ∏si=1 ri, we must have that l(α) ≥ ∑tj=1 ajpj (this
was first observed in [38]). A logarithmic signature for G achieving this bound is
called a minimal logarithmic signature (MLS).
A natural question to ask is: does every finite group admit a minimal logarith-
mic signature? If G has a normal subgroup N with G/N ∼= H and H and N both
have minimal logarithmic signatures then G has a minimal logarithmic signature.
Moreover, by considering composition series, it is clear that soluble groups admit
MLSs. Hence to answer the question in the affirmative it suffices to consider non-
abelian simple groups.
Magliveras [55] used an inductive argument to show the alternating groups
have MLSs. Gonza´lez Vasco et al. [37] derived the existence of MLSs for all groups
of order less than 175,560, and Holmes [47] proved the sporadic groups J1, J2, HS,
McL, Co3 and He admit MLSs. Lempken and van Trung [51] used a double coset
decomposition method to demonstrate the existence of MLSs for all but 8 simple
groups of order at most 1010. Furthermore, they show that their construction cannot
be applied to the 8 exceptions found. Several families of classical groups have been
shown to admit MLSs by Singhi et al. and Singhi and Singhi [81, 82], notably the
finite projective special linear groups and finite projective symplectic groups. The
question of whether or not all finite (simple) groups admit a minimal logarithmic
signature remains open.
All of the logarithmic signature constructions of an elementary abelian 2-group
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described in Chapter 4 are tame. Is this true for all constructions? Are there any
qualitatively different methods of constructing logarithmic signatures of an ele-
mentary abelian 2-group? One can ask the same questions for elementary abelian
p-groups, and abelian groups in general. Finally, what nonabelian groups admit
periodic/nonperiodic tilings?
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Appendix A
Computer Code
We provide illustrative implementation details of our attack on the BCFRX scheme
from Chapter 2. Computations were performed in Magma [59] on an Intel Core 2
Duo 1.66GHz laptop (and hence timings are somewhat slower than those quoted
in Chapter 2).
A.1 BCFRX Scheme
Here is the code for our attack on the BCFRX scheme. Recall we are looking to
compute the matrix N from Chapter 2, Section 2.1.
BCFRX := function(p)
G := SL(2,p);
Key := Random(SL(4,p));
M := Random(SL(4,p));
P<x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7,x8,y1,y2,y3,y4,y5,y6,y7,y8,y9,y10,y11,y12,y13,
y14,y15,y16> := PolynomialRing(GF(p),24);
N := Matrix(P,4,4,[1,0,x1,x2,0,1,x3,x4,x5,x6,1,0,x7,x8,0,1]);
Ninv := Matrix(P,4,4,[y1,y2,y3,y4,y5,y6,y7,y8,y9,y10,y11,y12,y13,y14,
y15,y16]);
// Let us store the sixteen equations N*Ninv=I_4 in a list S:
T1 := N*Ninv - ScalarMatrix(4,1);
S := [];
for i in [1..4] do
for j in [1..4] do
Append(˜S,T1[i,j]);
end for;
86
A.1 BCFRX SCHEME
end for;
// For l runs of the protocol, store the 8l equations˜(2.1.6) in S. For
a single run of the protocol we have:
l := 1;
for k in [1..l] do
a1 := Mˆ-1 * DiagonalJoin(Matrix(Random(G)),Identity(G)) * M;
a2 := Mˆ-1 * DiagonalJoin(Matrix(Random(G)),Identity(G)) * M;
b1 := Mˆ-1 * DiagonalJoin(Identity(G),Matrix(Random(G))) * M;
b2 := Mˆ-1 * DiagonalJoin(Identity(G),Matrix(Random(G))) * M;
C := b1 * Key * b2;
D := a1 * C * a2;
E := a1 * Key * a2;
T2 := N * D * Ninv - N * C * Ninv;
T3 := N * D * Ninv - N * E * Ninv;
for i in [1..2] do
for j in [1..2] do
Append(˜S,T2[i,j]);
Append(˜S,T3[i+2,j+2]);
end for;
end for;
end for;
// Now compute the ideal I generated by S, followed by the (lex ordered
) Groebner basis of I:
I := ideal<P|S>;
GB := GroebnerBasis(I);
return GB;
end function;
Let’s take a look at the Groebner basis for a small prime, say p = 97:
BCFRX(97);
[
x1 + 42*y16ˆ5 + 49*y16ˆ4 + 21*y16ˆ3 + 55*y16ˆ2 + 63*y16 + 18,
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x2 + 71*y16ˆ5 + 89*y16ˆ4 + 87*y16ˆ3 + 9*y16ˆ2 + 15*y16 + 52,
x3 + 24*y16ˆ5 + 61*y16ˆ4 + 75*y16ˆ3 + 81*y16ˆ2 + 28*y16 + 93,
x4 + 13*y16ˆ5 + 70*y16ˆ4 + 29*y16ˆ3 + 85*y16ˆ2 + 76*y16 + 50,
x5 + 26*y16ˆ5 + 50*y16ˆ4 + 40*y16ˆ3 + 32*y16ˆ2 + 69*y16 + 86,
x6 + 93*y16ˆ5 + 66*y16ˆ4 + 37*y16ˆ3 + 84*y16ˆ2 + 27*y16 + 92,
x7 + 76*y16ˆ5 + 65*y16ˆ4 + 85*y16ˆ3 + y16ˆ2 + 62*y16 + 3,
x8 + 78*y16ˆ5 + 12*y16ˆ4 + 79*y16ˆ3 + 31*y16ˆ2 + 92*y16 + 30,
y1 + 23*y16ˆ5 + 65*y16ˆ4 + 29*y16ˆ3 + 39*y16ˆ2 + 8*y16 + 72,
y2 + 58*y16ˆ5 + 39*y16ˆ4 + 28*y16ˆ3 + 38*y16ˆ2 + 46*y16 + 7,
y3 + 70*y16ˆ5 + y16ˆ4 + 25*y16ˆ3 + 64*y16ˆ2 + 64*y16 + 69,
y4 + 91*y16ˆ5 + 2*y16ˆ4 + 49*y16ˆ3 + 56*y16ˆ2 + 35*y16 + 80,
y5 + 60*y16ˆ5 + 80*y16ˆ4 + 67*y16ˆ3 + 93*y16ˆ2 + 44*y16 + 33,
y6 + 92*y16ˆ5 + 84*y16ˆ4 + 89*y16ˆ3 + 25*y16ˆ2 + 95*y16 + 17,
y7 + 39*y16ˆ5 + 49*y16ˆ4 + 37*y16ˆ3 + 10*y16ˆ2 + 3*y16 + 80,
y8 + 44*y16ˆ5 + 79*y16ˆ4 + 68*y16ˆ3 + 11*y16ˆ2 + 34*y16 + 16,
y9 + 79*y16ˆ5 + 75*y16ˆ4 + 95*y16ˆ3 + 52*y16ˆ2 + 93*y16 + 85,
y10 + 80*y16ˆ5 + 36*y16ˆ4 + 82*y16ˆ3 + 12*y16ˆ2 + 41*y16 + 2,
y11 + 18*y16ˆ5 + 52*y16ˆ4 + 21*y16ˆ3 + 64*y16ˆ2 + 7*y16 + 89,
y12 + 33*y16ˆ5 + 84*y16ˆ4 + 7*y16ˆ3 + 86*y16ˆ2 + 39*y16 + 5,
y13 + 84*y16ˆ5 + 20*y16ˆ4 + 49*y16ˆ3 + 2*y16ˆ2 + 14*y16 + 95,
y14 + 65*y16ˆ5 + 13*y16ˆ4 + 49*y16ˆ3 + 8*y16ˆ2 + 88*y16 + 66,
y15 + 20*y16ˆ5 + 87*y16ˆ4 + 81*y16ˆ3 + 25*y16ˆ2 + 12*y16 + 86,
y16ˆ6 + 17*y16ˆ5 + 11*y16ˆ4 + 48*y16ˆ3 + 71*y16ˆ2 + 79*y16 + 84
]
Note the particular form of these equations: once y16 is known the system is deter-
mined. We see that the final basis element is a degree six polynomial in y16. Thus
computing the zeros of this polynomial yields at most six values for N :
Factorisation(GB[24]);
[
<y16 + 8, 1>,
<y16 + 15, 1>,
<y16 + 18, 1>,
<y16 + 20, 1>,
<y16 + 71, 1>,
<y16 + 79, 1>
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]
Observing another run of the protocol (executing the for k in [1..l] do loop
again to add 8 new equations to our system) reveals a unique value for N :
GB;
[
x1 + 25, x2 + 37, x3 + 87, x4 + 53, x5 + 21, x6 + 23, x7 + 80, x8 +
29, y1 + 76, y2 + 6, y3 + 94, y4 + 26, y5 + 70, y6 + 49, y7 + 96,
y8 + 46, y9 + 5, y10 + 89, y11 + 10, y12 + 52, y13 + 59, y14 + 58,
y15 + 22, y16 + 18
]
To explore the feasibility of this attack, we return to the l = 1 case and run some
trials for larger values of p. To test that the Groebner basis elements typically take
the form of the above example, we create a function which on input a prime p runs
the above attack and verifies that (i) the first 23 basis elements have the form zi +
fi(y16), where zi ∈ {xi, yi} and (ii) the final basis element is a degree six polynomial
in y16:
BCFRX := function(p)
.. // as above
t := Cputime();
GB := GroebnerBasis(I);
t := Cputime(t)
for i in [1..#GB-1] do
if Degree(Monomials(GB[i])[1]) ne 1 or Monomials(GB[i])[2] lt y16
then
print "The knights who say";
end if;
end for;
if Degree(GB[#GB]) ne 6 or IsUnivariate(GB[#GB],y16) ne true then
print "Ni";
end if;
return t;
end function;
For example, running 1000 trials for random 100 bit primes we have:
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n := 1000;
c := 0;
for m in [1..n] do
c := c + BCFRX(RandomPrime(100));
end for;
print c/n;
16.735
Similarly, for random 200 and 300 bit primes it takes roughly 23 seconds and 33
seconds respectively.
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